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Since 1972 the body of law regulating political finance in the
United States has changed almost completely.' Some argue that these
changes have adversely affected our political parties. 2 Even if that opin-
ion is correct, the larger question of whether we should be concerned
about the weakening of the political parties remains. These are com-
plex issues that require, at a minimum, a three-fold inquiry. First, how
do we define our political parties and their role in the American polity?
Second, how do the new campaign finance laws apply to political par-
ties, both directly and indirectly? Finally, what have been the practical
effects of these laws on the political parties?
* President, Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Wayne State Univer-
sity, Detroit, Michigan. A.B., 1958 Harvard College; J.D., 1961, Harvard Law School;
Ph.D., 1967, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
1. The following campaign finance legislation has been enacted since 1972: the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); the Revenue Act
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, as amended 87 Stat. 138 (1973); the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 and the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339.
The principal campaign finance law preceeding the Federal Election Campaign Act
and its subsequent amendments was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. III, 43
Stat. 1070 (1925) (codified in scattered sections of 2 and 18 U.S.C. (1970)) (repealed 1972).
Its most important legacy was the prohibition of corporate treasury contributions or expend-
itures in general election campaigns for federal offices. 2 U.S.C. § 241 (1940). In 1947 Con-
gress extended this prohibition to primary elections and added a ban on the use of union
treasury funds for federal campaign purposes. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947, ch. 120, tit. III, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)).
2. See, e.g., J. KIRKPATRICK, DISMANTLING THE PARTIES 14, 21, 23 (1978); Ranney,
Political Parties.- Reform and Decline, in THE NEw AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 213, 241-
45 (A. King ed. 1978).
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The first of these questions has been at the center of a lively debate
among scholars and journalists for decades, and probably will never be
resolved.' However, its outlines can be sketched. The second question
lends itself to relatively simple and straightforward analysis. The third
line of inquiry is hindered because the political finance laws have been
repeatedly amended and because their lifetime has been so brief that
the ability of political parties to adapt to these laws is still being tested.
Nonetheless, preliminary inquiry is useful because further changes in
campaign finance law are likely, and those making the changes should
be informed by whatever systematic analysis is possible.4
I. Discovering and Defining Political Parties
Americans use the term "the party" loosely.5 Sometimes they ap-
pear to use the term to refer to party workers, organizations, and com-
mittees. At other times it appears to mean government officials who
are members of the same party. Often, especially with the recent atten-
tion to public opinion polls, "the party" constitutes all the voters who
identify themselves as partisans and who generally vote for the candi-
dates of their party. The leading text on political parties acknowledges
these three usages: "the major political parties are in truth three-
headed political giants, tripartite systems of interactions . . .. As
political structures they include a party organization, a party in office,
and a party in the electorate."6 Recognition of the tripartite party is
essential for any discussion of political finance because laws and prac-
3. See H. AGAR, THE PRICE OF UNION (1950); D. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER: THE
FAILURE OF POLITICS IN AMERICA (1972); J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY
(1963); P. HERRING, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN PARTIES IN ACTION (1940);
J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2; POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EIGHTIES (R. Goldwin ed. 1980);
A. RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION (1975); A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DE-
MOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (1956); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY Gov-
ERNMENT (1942); F. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 6-8, 370-96 (4th ed. 1979);
American Political Science Assoc., Comm. on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible
Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL. ScI. REV. (Supp. 1950); Goodman, How Much Political
Party Centralization Do We Want?, 13 J. POL. 536 (1951); Kirkpatrick, Toward a More Re-
sponsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science or Pseudo-Science?, 65 AM.
POL. ScI. REv. 965 (1971); Ranney, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Com-
mentary, 45 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 488 (1951); Stedman & Sonthoff, Party Responsibility-A
Critical Inquiry, 4 W. POL. Q. 454 (195 1); Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44
AM. POL. SCI. REv. (Supp. 1980).
4. See, e.g., Gaunt, Campaign Financing Faces Senate Scrutiny, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 170 (1983); Taylor, Efforts to Revise Campaign Laws Aim at P.4 Cs, Washington Post,
Feb. 28, 1983, at A5, col. 1.
5. F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 6-18.
6. Id at 8.
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tices affect these three party elements differently, and each impact will
alter the relationships between the three branches of the parties.
The picture of parties as three-headed political giants is only a line
drawing. A fully developed picture is vastly more complex. Each of
the three divisions is indeed a "system of interactions."7 This is best
illustrated by the party organization. Americans think of the party or-
ganization as a hierarchy headed by the national parties and followed
at each lower level by the state parties, county, city, and town parties,
and then the ward and precinct parties. 8 This portrayal is deceptively
simple. The national, state, and local parties are generally quite in-
dependent of one another.9 The national committees have been scorn-
fully described as "politics without power,"' 0 while city and county
parties are often characterized as "political machines."'I Moreover, the
party units at each level may be quite independent of one another.
Similar decentralization is found in party relations in government.
At any level of government the party group in the legislature may be
quite separate in organization, operation, and outlook from the execu-
tive of the same party. Furthermore, the influence of a party's federal
officeholders over their colleagues in the state capitol, city and town
halls, and county courthouses may be very slight indeed.
The emphasis on the nonhierarchical nature of parties is signifi-
cant for political finance regulation for several reasons.' z First, it
serves as a reminder that political finance laws may affect some levels
or groups in the party but not others. Second, it focuses attention on
parties as congeries of individuals and organizations whose relation-
ships to one another are based on common goals, mutual respect, per-
sonal relationships, and political resources. As money has become an
increasingly important political resource, the financial strength of the
many centers of party organization may help to shape their interactions
with one another. If political finance laws or practices shift funding
strength between levels of the party or among organizations at the same
governmental level, patterns of influence within the party may follow.
Third, it helps direct examination of how money is used within political
7. Id
8. Id at 60-67, 110-18.
9. See E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 129-51.
10. C. COrTER & B. HENNESSY, POLITICS WITHOUT POWER: THE NATIONAL PARTY
COMMITtEES (1964).
11. See, e.g., E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 144-51.
12. For a discussion of the conceptual importance of party decentralization for political
finance practices, see D. ADAMANY, CAMPAIGN FUNDS AS AN INTRAPARTY POLITICAL RE-
SOURCE; CONNECTICUT, 1966-68, at 7-11, 52-57 (1972).
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parties. Specifically, it is important to discover whether different ele-
ments or levels in the parties need and use money for different pur-
poses, and what the consequences are for party effectiveness and for the
governmental process when campaign funds are used in these different
ways.
II. The Activities of Political Parties
There is a heated controversy about the role of political parties in
democracies. One view holds that democracies cannot survive without
political parties because the parties are essential for the performance of
certain "functions" that must occur in free societies.' 3 A particularly
exuberant assertion of this theory states: "No America without democ-
racy, no democracy without politics, no politics without parties, no par-
ties without compromise and moderation."' 4
Another approach acknowledges that parties in democracies have
engaged in certain activities that have strengthened self-government.
This approach-aptly described by one of its adherents as a "minimal-
ist" view"--does not aver that a free society is incapable of success-
fully conducting its affairs without the performance of these activities;
nor does it insist that these important activities can be performed only
by political parties. 16 Nevertheless, adherents of this approach see par-
ties as valuable contributors to the democratic process; and, in general,
they seek to promote the health of parties as a means of strengthening
democracy.
The scholarly debate about the role of political parties need not be
rehearsed to address the issues raised by new laws and practices in fi-
nancing politics. It is sufficient to acknowledge that parties perform a
number of functions that support our system of government. The fol-
13. See Lowi, Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in
Party Systems, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 570 (1963). The functionalist approach assumes that
certain functions are necessary for the operation of societies and then searches for institu-
tions which perform those functions. This approach is elaborately stated in a volume deal-
ing with developing nations, rather than specifically with political parties. See G. ALMOND
& J. COLEMAN, THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPING AREAS (1960). See also C. MERRIAM & H.
GOSNELL, THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (1949).
Critical views of the functionalist approach to political parties can be found in Scarrow,
The Function of Political Parties: A Critique of the Literature and the.Approach, 29 J. POL. 770
(1967), and King, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 2 POLITY 111 (1969).
14. C. ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 1 (1960).
15. Fishel, American Political Parties and Elections: An Over'iew, in PARTIES AND
ELECTIONS IN AN ANTI-PARTY AGE xvi (J. Fishel ed. 1978).
16. See, e.g., L. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (1967); F.
SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (1964).
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lowing discussion describes four activities that have been important in
supporting democratic processes, and estimates how they will be af-
fected by changing campaign finance laws.
First, parties have been credited with significant responsibility for
"structuring the vote" and for "political socialization." Simply put,
structuring the vote means that parties provide an opportunity for vot-
ers to have a readily identifiable choice at the polls. 7 Generally, this
activity involves parties in attempting to direct the choices made by
voters by appealing for support for party candidates. According to
Anthony King, "[e]fforts to structure the vote can range from the sim-
ple allocation of party labels to candidates to the conduct of large-scale
educational and propaganda campaigns." 8
Political socialization also involves persuasion, but its focus is
broader than winning support for particular candidates or issues associ-
ated with a party. Frank Sorauf explained this function as follows:
"The parties participate in the political socialization of the American
electorate by transmitting political values and information to large
numbers of voters and future voters. They preach the value of political
commitment and activity, and they convey information and cues about
the confusing political system."' 9 Parties do not undertake political so-
cialization from altruistic motives, of course. They emphasize the
value of political participation in order to encourage their adherents to
vote, to engage in party work, and to contribute money. Indeed, the
overt manifestations of political socialization by parties--conducting
registration and get-out-the-vote drives, soliciting money and man-
power through mail, telephone, and door-to-door appeals, and seeking
to recruit new party members-are party efforts to mobilize voters and
resources. Socialization is thus a consequence of parties' campaigning
and building their organizations. In the modem era much of the re-
sponsibility for managing campaigns has shifted to candidates them-
selves; it may well be that the "party in government" contributes at
least as much as party organizations to political socialization.
A second important function performed by parties is the accumu-
lation of political power20 by "representing and aggregating multiple
group interests."2 ' Sorauf has captured an important element of this
party function:
17. L. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 77 ("Structuring the vote is the minimum function of a
political party in a modem democracy.").
18. King, supra note 13, at 120.
19. F. SoRAuF, supra note 3, at 13-14.
20. Id at 14.
21. Fishel, supra note 15, at xvii.
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[Parties] aggregate masses of ineffectual individuals and groups
and thereby organize blocs powerful enough to govern or to op-
pose those who govern. . . . By using his or her attachment to
the party as a perceptual screen, the voter has a master clue for
assessing issues and candidates. So both within the individual
and in the external political world, the political party operates to
focus political loyalties on a small number of alternatives and
thus to accumulate support behind them.22
This definition is limited, however, to the aggregation of individuals
who support the party, its platform, and its candidates simply because
of their self-identification with one party label rather than another.
Other commentators have emphasized the brokerage role that par-
ties have traditionally played. Party leaders have an interest in reach-
ing out to various blocs and in bringing them into the party coalition.'
In doing so, party leaders assure each group that some of its aspirations
will be incorporated into the party platform and will become public
policy if the party and its candidates are successful. In a more subtle
form, this aggregation of interests occurs when groups are drawn into
the party as participants in party governance and affairs. Recent com-
mitments by the Democratic party to set aside twenty-five positions at-
large on the Democratic National Committee for representatives of un-
ions and of blacks24 are an uncharacteristically overt method of assem-
bling interest groups within the party structure.
Whatever the process of accumulating interests, the purported
benefit to a democratic polity is twofold. First, fragmentation is dimin-
ished. Political forces are assembled in a relatively small number of
party coalitions which pose identifiable and understandable alterna-
tives and have sufficient strength to advance these alternatives in the
governmental forum. Second, a multitude of interests will find their
aspirations represented in the government. This will diminish the dan-
ger that these interests will feel abandoned, and will prevent them from
going into permanent opposition to the governmental system.
A third significant activity engaged in by parties is recruiting polit-
ical leaders. 25 The exact manner in which recruitment takes place is
difficult to specify. At one time it might have been accurate to say that
political parties recruited elected officials by nominating them for of-
fice. But party conventions and caucuses no longer select the candi-
22. F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 14.
23. W. KEEFE, PARTIES, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 22-23 (2d ed. 1976).
24. Murray, Campaign Blitz Makes Manatt DNC Chairman, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
394 (1981).
25. See, e.g., J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, at 5-13; L. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 201-
31; W. KEEFE, supra note 23, at 21-22.
dates who will appear on the ballot under the party banner. In most
jurisdictions, this function is performed by primary elections.26 None-
theless, parties may still engage in the recruitment of politicians. Party
leaders may give encouragement to potential candidates. In a few ju-
risdictions, party organizations still endorse candidates.27
In districts dominated by the other party, leaders of the minority
party actively search out candidates who will "fill the ticket." This is
not an insignificant enterprise. From the party perspective, it strength-
ens the ticket by drawing whatever following the candidate has to the
party ticket. From a broader perspective, it provides voters with a
choice at the polls in order to show discontent with incumbents. In-
deed, there is no real democratic process in elections unless voters have
a choice of candidates.
In addition to recruiting candidates, parties often recruit officials.
Many appointed officials are recommended initially by party leaders
and have participated actively in partisan affairs. Those who are
neither identified with a party nor recommended by party leaders are
often nonetheless cleared by party leaders.
Parties also recruit political activists. Party organizations actively
seek to recruit new workers, contributors, and members.28 This is one
route by which people are brought into the political process and, for
many, into governmental roles. Here, the recruitment function inter-
sects with a party's political socialization activities.
A fourth party function is the role that parties play in governance.
There are important differences in the governing roles attributed to
parties. Most political observers agree that:
The American parties are a force for unification in the divided
American political system. The decentralization, even fragmen-
tation, of government is an incontestably crucial fact of American
politics. To the fragmentation of the nation and the fifty states,
multiplied by the three-fold separation of power in each, the two
great national parties bring a unifying centripetal. force. They
help to hold together the disparate fragments of government by
bringing similar traditions, interest, symbols, and issues to all the
parts. They unify with an obviously limited efficiency: for exam-
ple, they often fail to bind president and Congress together in
causes that transcend the separation of powers. But they do con-
stitute a force for unity, a political .adhesive, in a set of institu-
26. F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 203-10.
27. Id at 210-11, 214-17; see also M. Jewell, The State Party Convention As a Device
For Influencing Primary Elections (1983) (paper presented at annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association).
28. F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 91-96.
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tions that divides.29
There is less agreement on the extent to which parties offer coher-
ent programs in elections, develop policies while in government, and
organize to promote the enactment of these programs and policies. In-
deed, there is disagreement on whether the American parties should do
this. One perspective is that the principal role of parties is to collect the
diverse interests in American society into coalitions and thereby serve
as "[t]he unwitting but forceful suppressors of the 'civil-war potential!
we carry always in the bowels of our diverse nation."30 There are dif-
ferences between the parties, but each party includes some elements
from every group and viewpoint in American society, so that "[t]he
difference. . . is one of tendencies rather than principles."'" This dif-
ference, although slight, provides voters with some degree of choice.
This perspective concludes that ultimately: "[The parties] are weak
agents in the struggle for power because they have been strong agents
in the course of our rise to nationhood. It has been their historic mis-
sion to hold the line against some of the most powerful centrifugal
forces in American society ....
A wholly different approach to the governmental function suggests
that there are substantial differences between the parties,33 that these
differences should be clarified and re-enforced, and that parties should
take greater responsibility for explicitly stating policies and assuring
their adoption.34 A few commentators contend that officeholders who
do not support the party should be subject to some form of discipline."
Party discipline is deemed essential if parties are to formulate coherent
policies, present them to the voters, and then enact those policies if they
win an electoral mandate.
At a minimum, the parties are vehicles for retrospective judgment
by the voters. When a party fails to satisfy the electorate, voters can
turn to the other party. This view is substantiated by the fact that vot-
29. Id. at 14.
30. C. RoSSITER, supra note 14, at 59.
31. Id at 148.
32. Id at 54.
33. There is considerable literature suggesting substantial differences in policy beliefs
and ideological perspectives between those active in the two parties. A sampling of the
evidence can be found in N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETRocIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN
VOTER 200-09 (1976); Ranney, supra note 2, at 234-36; McClosky, Hoffman & O'Hara, Issue
Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers, 54 AM. POL. SCI. Rnv. 406
(1960); Nexon, Asymmetry in the Political System: OccasionalActivists in the Republican and
Democratic Parties, 1956-1964, 65 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 716 (1971).
34. See E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 3.
35. See, e.g., American Poliltical Science Assn., Toward a More Responsible Two-Party
System, supra note 3.
SYMPOSIUM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
ers who shift from one party to another actually share the views of the
candidates or parties to which they transfer their support.
36
For this article the crucial issue is whether campaign finance legis-
lation strengthens the capacity of parties to perform the following func-
tions: 1) structure the vote and engage in political socialization;
2) aggregate and represent multiple interests; 3) recruit political lead-
ers; 4) govern, either by suppressing conflict and thus promoting stabil-
ity or by formulating clear alternatives and converting them into public
policy. Unfortunately, the impact of political finance laws on the abil-
ity of parties to engage in these activities is difficult to separate from
other factors that also bear on party performance. There is general
agreement that parties have undergone dramatic change in recent
years. Some commentators believe that the direction of change has
been to weaken parties. It is therefore necessary, before reviewing re-
cent campaign finance legislation and assessing its impact, to describe
the changing condition of American political parties and the reasons
for those changes.
III. The Thesis of Party Decline
There is a great deal of modem commentary announcing the de-
cline or demise of political parties.37 In general, these narratives detail
such phenomena as declining party allegiance in the electorate, waning
effectiveness in party organizations, and deteriorating party cohesion in
government.
No sooner had the thesis of party decline become popular than
there emerged a revisionist view arguing that American parties are not
terminally ill.38 Although these revisionists acknowledge that parties
are changing in many ways, they emphasize evidence of continuing
strength of party organizations and signs that parties are adapting to
modem methods of campaigning. Some even argue that the party ap-
paratus in government has continuing vitality.3 9 Several authors be-
lieve that the life signs of parties signal only continuing life rather than
robust good health; however, they have little difficulty recommending
36. See, e.g., V. 0. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE (1966); Boyd, Popular Control
of Public Policy. .4 Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election, 66 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 429
(1972).
37. See, e.g., W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE (1980); J.
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2; Ranney, Political Parties, supra note 2.
38. See, e.g., PARTY RENEWAL IN AMERICA (G. Pomper ed. 1980); Cotter & Bibby,
Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline, 95 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1980).
39. See Ornstein & Rhode, Political Parties and Congressionalleform, in PARTIES AND
ELECTIONS IN AN ANTI-PARTY AGE 280-94 (J. Fishel ed. 1978).
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modest reforms that would revive the patient.4 °
The ensuing sections detail the evidence of party decline, note the
signs of continuing party vitality, and suggest the causes of party afflic-
tion. The general thrust of these observations is that the primary
causes of party distress are not found in campaign finance laws and
that there is some prospect for adaptation by and revitalization of par-
ties to their modem environment. Parties may well play an important
role in American politics, albeit a different role from their tradition.
A. Evidence and Counterevidence of Party Decline
The most persuasive evidence of party decline is the decrease in
allegiance among voters. While the percentage of voters identifying
themselves as independents has increased markedly, the percentage of
voters who identify themselves as Democrats or Republicans has de-
clined.1 This decline is especially sharp among younger people; this
.raises the possibility that as younger generations displace older ones,
the decline in party affiliation will become even more pronounced.42 In
comparison to other American governmental and political institutions,
the parties are held in relatively low esteem by the public. 43 Split-ticket
voting is on the rise in elections for national offices and at the state and
local levels.' Moreover, there has been a sharp decline in the extent to
which voters evaluate candidates by their party label. Voters now eval-
uate candidates based on candidates' individual characteristics and
their positions on important issues.45 Formerly such issue posturing
40. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CHALLENGE OF
GOVERNANCE (J. Fleishman ed. 1982).
41. See, e.g., W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 26-33; F. SoRAuF, supra
note 3, at 138. The percentage of Americans reporting that they were "independent" rather
than identified with a political party rose from 24% in 1956 to 36% in 1976. Id A prelimi-
nary report on 1980 shows that 34% of the respondents identified themselves as "independ-
ent." Roettger & Winebrenner, The Voting Behavior ofAmerican Political Scientists: The
1980 Presidential Election 36 W. POL. Q. 134, 137 (1983).
42. See, e.g., W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 40-41; N. NIE, S. VERBA &
J. PETROCIK, supra note 33, at 59-66.
43. Dennis, Trends in Public Support/or the American Party System, in PARTIES AND
ELECTIONS IN AN ANTI-PARTY AGE 3-21 (J. Fishel ed. 1978). A 1976 Wisconsin survey
showed that on a 7 point scale measuring public confidence in 12 institutions, political par-
ties rated 11th. Each of the three branches of the federal government, the federal, state and
local governments, the police, military, and federal bureaucracy, and national elections all
engendered more public confidence than did the political parties. Adamany & Grossman,
Supportfor the Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 5 LAw & POLICY Q. 405, 411
(1983).
44. See, e.g., W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 34-35; N. NiE, S. VERBA &
J. PETROCIK, supra note 33, at 67-68.
45. See N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 33, at 156-73.
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was associated predominantly with parties rather than candidates.4 6
Hence, parties have lost some of their relevance to specific issues that
are important to voters, while candidates have gained visibility on
those issues.4'
Another commonly cited indicator of party demise is the alleged
sharp decline in institutional party strength. There is, however, little
documentation for this proposition since there have been few system-
atic studies of either the strengths or activities of party organizations a.4
Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make sweeping general-
izations about institutional vitality since party organizations exist on
many different levels. Although the once powerful urban political ma-
chines are in poor condition, there are indications that state49 and lo-
cal5° party organizations are in good health.
46. See Wattenberg, The Decline ofPoliticalPartsanship in the United States: Negativity
or Neutrality?, 75 Am. POL. Sci. Rv. 941, 947-48 (1981).
47. This may not be surprising in an era marked by campaigns centered on candidates,
but it also suggests potential for party resurgence among the electorate if parties develop
visibility on issues. This is not too far fetched, since generally voters perceive that parties
differ on both issues and general political philosophy. Id at 943; G. POMPER, VOTERS'
CHOICE 166-85 (1975). The difficulty for parties is that voters do not associate specific issue
stances with the parties. Therefore, the question is whether parties can take steps to re-
establish the link between the party label and issues about which voters feel strongly.
48. See W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, for a commentary on party decline
that omits any evidence or discussion of the purported atrophy in political party
organizations.
49. Recent studies show that 90% of state party organizations maintain permanent
headquarters, 90% have a full time executive director or party chairman, and 63% have five
or more staff workers. J. Gibson, C. Cotter, J. Bibby, & R. Huckshorn, Assessing Institu-
tional Party Strength, 18-20 (paper presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Association). Party budgets averaged $340,000, which is more than double the
budgets of a decade earlier. Id at 19. Two-thirds of the state organizations operate ongoing
electoral mobilization programs involving voter identification, voter registration and get-
out-the-vote efforts. They also conduct occasional polling, offer training sessions for candi-
dates and workers, and make at least modest efforts to recruit and financially support candi-
dates. Id at 24-27.
50. A survey of the nation's 3662 counties, towns, and districts showed that the Demo-
crats had no organization whatsoever in only 73 and a Republican presence was missing in
only 209. Id at 38. These local parties are aptly described as "skeletal." L. EPSTEIN, supra
note 16, at 101. Only 8% reported any full-time or part-time staff, only 13% maintained
year-round offices, and only 26% had formal budgets. However, 75% met on at least a quar-
terly basis. Moreover, despite the thinness of the party apparatus, the vast majority were
involved in recruiting candidates for Congress, county office, or the state legislature. About
two-thirds made campaign contributions. Grassroots campaign activities were widespread:
66% distributed posters or signs, and 62% purchased advertising. The majority reported
providing at least 8 of 14 specified services to assist their candidates. J. Gibson, C. Cotter, J.
Bibby & R. Huckshorn, supra note 49, at 37-40. A 1976 survey shows an increase in the
percentage of voters personally contacted during the campaign, but it does not specify
whether these contracts are by candidate organizations or political parties. M. Wolfe, Per-
sonal Contact Campaigning in Presidential Elections: Who's Been Talking to All Those
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The third and final aspect of party decline is the party's diminish-
ing role in government. Commentary on this phenomenon tends to fo-
cus on three specific developments. First, it is said that the President's
role as a party leader has waned. The President no longer has much
stake in providing leadership to the party organization; furthermore, he
increasingly lacks the capacity to lead his own party in the government,
especially in Congress. A leading scholar explained this development
as follows:
Presidential candidates run for office without relying on party or-
ganizations, by hiring media and campaign technicians, and by
making personalistic and issue-oriented appeals to the voters.
This approach has assured a growing separation between the
President and his party.51
The converse of this situation, however, is also undoubtedly true: the
party organization can no longer control or deliver the vote; a presiden-
tial candidate is therefore compelled, in some measure, to run a media-
based, non-party campaign.
The presumed decline of presidential leadership in Congress is
prompted, in part, by the same factors. Members of Congress run non-
party campaigns, and the President's influence over them directly or
through the party organization is consequently diminished.5" An exec-
utive branch liaison to Congress recently lamented: "It used to be that
a central piece of information on a vote was the president's position.
Now the central information is the issue. With the breakdown of party
discipline, it is clear that voters expect members to exercise independ-
ent judgment."53
The independence of congressmen from the President is also
heightened by the increased electoral security that accompanies incum-
bency. Political scientists have remarked on the "disappearing
marginals"-the infrequency of races for seats in the House in which
an incumbent is defeated or even closely challenged. Senate incum-
bents are somewhat less secure, but they continue to enjoy a seventy-
five percent re-election rate.54 Finally, presidential coattails have virtu-
ally disappeared, making congressional candidates less dependent on
Voters and What Have They Accomplished? (1979) (paper presented at annual meeting of
the Midwest Political Association).
51. Orren, The Changing Styles of American Party Politics, in THE FUTURE OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL PARTIES 41 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982).
52. See Agranoff, The New Style of Campaigning: The Decline of Party and the Rise of
Candidate-Centered Technology, in THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 3-49 (R
Agranoff ed. 1972).
53. W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 238-39.
54. Id at 192-93.
the fate of their party's presidential nominee and therefore less reliant
on their national party." Under these circumstances presidential lead-
ership of his party in Congress becomes difficult indeed.
The second asserted trend toward party decline in government is
the decentralization of power in Congress. In brief, this decentraliza-
tion occurred with the shift of authority from party leaders and party
caucuses to the Rules Committee and to committee chairmen, who
were selected solely on the basis of seniority. The dispersion of legisla-
tive authority to subcommittees and subcommittee chairmen has dif-
fused policy leadership and put members who are not strong partisans
in positions of legislative leadership. 6 Furthermore, in the Senate the
filibuster has been increasingly used to block leadership initiatives by
the majority party as well as by the President. 7
There is, however, a countervailing trend in the House of Repre-
sentatives. The party leadership gained substantial authority as a result
of reform in the House during the 1970's. 8 The Speaker of the House
now dominates the Rules Committee, which, in the view of one ob-
server, "was effectively transformed from master to servant of the
House."5 9 The establishment of the Steering and Policy Committee to
shape legislative strategy and recommend committee appointments has
given party leaders considerable authority over the committee system."0
The Democratic party caucus has been revitalized, and it has refused to
elect or re-elect committee chairmen who have obstructed the party
program.6' The House Democrats have also adopted rule changes to
make the attachment of "riders" to appropriations bills more difficult,
55. Id at 194-96.
56. Patterson, The Semi-Sovereign Congress, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYS-
TEm 125, 167 (A. King ed. 1979).
57. W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 214-16; Ornstein & Rhode, supra
note 39, at 280-81.
58. See generally Ornstein & Rhode, supra note 39, at 281-91; Patterson, supra note 56,
at 160-69.
59. Sundquist, Party Decay and the Capacity to Govern: The Challenge of Governance,
in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 42, 50 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982).
60. Ornstein & Rhode, supra note 39, at 286. In the 98th Session of Congress, the
House Democratic leadership strengthened party discipline by ousting Rep. Phil Gramm
from the House Budget Committee because of his vigorous collaboration with the White
House and the Republicans on President Reagan's budget and tax program in the prior
session. See Plattner, House Panel Seats Assigned: Democrats Tighten Control, 41 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 4 (1983); Tate, Gramm: An Unrepentant Weevil Bolts Par, 41 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 5 (1983).
61. See Ornstein & Rhode, supra note 39, at 288-89. Rep. G.V. Montgomery who sided
with the Republicans on President Reagan's budget and tax programs, was given a 16 to 11
vote in the Steering and Policy Committee to retain his chairmanship of the Veterans' Af-
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thereby strengthening the leadership's ability to shape legislation.62
The third suggested measure of declining party strength in govern-
ment is congressional roll call voting. Since the early 1960's, there has
been a decline in the percentage of roll call votes with "party line"
voting-that is, a roll call in which the majority of members of one
party are in opposition to a majority of members of the other party.63
"Party line" votes constituted half or more of the total annual roll call
votes only once in the Senate and twice in the House during that pe-
riod." This may be said to reflect a relatively low level of party unity
and a relatively modest party difference in Congress.
Viewed from another perspective, one might reach a different con-
clusion about the role of parties in congressional voting. Although
there is considerable variation from year to year, party-line voting in
the Ninety-seventh Congress was only five percent less than in the
Eight-eighth Congress two decades earlier.65 Many roll calls deal with
issues about which the parties have not adopted different positions and
are not identified by the public as representing alternative perspectives.
The President's role as party leader is revealed by roll call voting
in Congress. Only once in two decades has the President's party in
either house failed to give him a majority of its votes on a majority of
the legislative measures he endorsed; and generally the President's
party has given him majority support on sixty percent of roll call
votes.66 Similarly, the opposition party always casts a majority of its
votes against a majority of the President's legislative initiatives.67 Fur-
and making clear that he "got the message" to support the party leadership whenever possi-
ble. Plattner, supra note 60, at 4, 6.
62. Plattner, Democrats Force Changes in House Rules, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 7
(1983).
63. See, e.g., F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 341; Democrats Overtake GOP in Party-Line
Vote Loyalty, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 107-08 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Democrats].
The extent of decline in partisanship in congressional roll call voting depends on the base-
line one selects. Scholars initially assessed party voting as those roll calls on which 90% of
the members of the other party. By this measure, a high degree of cohesion characterized
the House of Representatives in the decades just prior to the turn of the century. By the
1930's, party cohesion in Congress had measurably declined. Partisanship has continued to
decline, using either the 90% rule or the more generous measure employed by Congressional
Quarterly. J. TURNER, PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY: PRESSURES ON CONGRESS 15-39 (E.
Schneider rev. ed. 1970).
64. F. SoRAuF, supra note 3, at 341; Democrats, supra note 63, at 107.
65. See F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 339.
66. W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 237; Cohodas, Presidential Support
Study Shows Reagan Rating Fell 10 Percentage Points in 1982, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
94-96 (1983).
67. W. CROTrY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 237; Cohodas, Presidential Support,
supra note 66, at 94-96.
SYMPOSIUM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
thermore, the President has been successful in gaining congressional
support on more than fifty percent of all the roll calls since 1953, and
seventy percent of the roll calls in twenty-one of those thirty years.
6 8
The percentage of presidential victories has been higher for Democratic
presidents because they have had a majority in both houses for twenty-
eight of those thirty years.69 Even so, the ability of both Democratic
and Republican Presidents to fashion victories using majority support
among their own partisans together with some support from opposition
party members is impressive.
Finally, there is persuasive evidence that the two parties are be-
coming more cohesive and more ideological in congressional voting.
Except for the Southern Democrats and Northeastern Republicans,
Democrats in every region of the nation consistently have been far
more liberal in congressional roll call voting than their Republican
counterparts.70
When one considers the evidence in total, the much proclaimed
and decried decline of American parties appears to be only a modest
tendency. Party decline is sharpest in the electorate, where both self-
proclaimed party affiliation and party-line voting have plummeted.
This may foretell significant deterioration in party organizations and in
partisanship in government. To date, however, elements in the party,
with the exception of the old-style urban machine, have been weakened
only slightly during the post-war period. It remains to be seen whether
political finance laws and practices have contributed significantly to the
party decline that has occurred.
B. The Causes of Party Decline
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, an important advocate of the thesis of party
decline, has suggested several causes of party decomposition: "this
trend has had and continues to have various sources-cultural, social,
technological, demographic, political, and legal-but. . . the most im-
portant sources of party decomposition are the decisions taken by per-
sons attempting to reform the parties.' 71
Other scholars do not unequivocally identify reform efforts as the
68. W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 236; Cohodas, Presidential Support,
supra note 66, at 94-96.
69. W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 236.
70. See Shaffer, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 35 W. POL. Q.
92-106 (1982).
71. J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, at 2 (emphasis in original).
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most important cause of party decline. 2 Professor Orren has bluntly
argued that "it is a sentimental self-deception to believe that the
amendment of election rules will suddenly revive strong party struc-
tures." 3 Instead, he distinguished three forces that contribute to party
decomposition: 1) long-term social and geographic trends; 2) changes
in the media, especially the growth of television in the political process;
3) the laws and rules that regulate the campaign process. 74
Demographic and Social Trends. It is clear that a better educated
populace is less likely to rely on party precinct leaders to guide their
vote. They will instead look to a multitude of information sources.
Moreover, an educated population is less likely to find attractive the
traditional incentives for political action or political loyalty: they do
not seek patronage jobs, clubhouse socializing, or private welfare.
Population mobility breaks down neighborhood ties and severs
connections to precinct organizations. A proponent of political action
committees has argued the case persuasively:
No longer, for example, does all political campaign activity re-
volve around local precincts. Precinct politics was based on the
premise, true at the time, that the warm relationship between
neighbors would make them receptive to the opinions of neigh-
borhood political opinion leaders (footnote in original omitted).
The demise of the neighborhood as the center of social or eco-
nomic activity, however, has signaled the demise of neighbor-
hood or precinct politics.
Today we are not influenced by neighborhood leaders, but
rather by particular occupational or socio-economic group lead-
ers. Consequently, our politics are no longer neighborhood
based, but directed toward particular occupational or socio-eco-
nomic groups.7 5
Media Technology. The impact of technology on parties is readily
understood. Some have called television "the new political god...
the principal influence acting on the voter in a campaign and his chief
source of information . . . and the one he trusts most implicitly.
'76
Television messages and computer-prepared communications create a
72. See, e.g., W. KEEFE, supra note 23, at 171-72; Sorauf, Political Parties and Political
Action Committees: Two Lfe Cycles, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. 445, 446-50, 454-62 (1980). Both L.
Epstein and James Sundquist emphasize patronage as a basis for party organization. L.
EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 108, 233-42; Sundquist, supra note 59, at 47-48.
73. Orren, supra note 51, at 32.
74. Id. at 31-32.
75. EMiott, PoliticalAction Committee-Precincts of the 80's, 22 Aiuz. L. REv. 539, 540-
41(1980).
76. W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, supra note 37, at 67.
link between candidates and voters without the need for party
intermediaries.
As party cues have become less important to voters, and candidate
cues have become more important, media are better suited than tradi-
tional organizations to the tasks of persuasion and mobilization. Can-
didates are assured of broader coverage and more consistency (or
specialization, where appropriate) in their communications to voters by
disseminating their messages through the media rather than through an
army of campaign workers.
Even in the nomination process, mass media have displaced party
elites as a means of communication among those who will make deci-
sions.7 7 This is obviously true when nominations are made in state or
local primaries, since these nominations are actually a series of elec-
tions possessing most of the properties of the general election. In the
presidential nominating process, the mass media have also dominated
the establishment of connections between contributors, caucus partici-
pants, local workers, and candidates for the nomination.78
Laws and Regulations. Professor Orren has argued that the long-
term social and demographic trends which have weakened parties are
generally beyond the control of policymakers.7 9 He believes that the
expanding influence of mass media is probably irreversible, and that
efforts to regulate their political uses would raise constitutional chal-
lenges based on the First Amendment." Orren contends that "[i]f we
are to strengthen political parties, we must exercise leverage where it is
strongest, in the third category of factors-the rules and regulations
governing elections."'"
For several reasons it is highly unlikely that the rules and regula-
tions outside the campaign finance area will be altered in a manner that
would strengthen parties. First, it would seem an implausible step to
restore the strength of party precinct organizations by returning to the
system of patronage appointments, preferential contracting, and other
economic favors. Yet, there is recognition among scholars that the pa-
tronage system was the glue that held the political machine together in
77. See Polsby, The News Media as an Alternative to Party in the Presidential Selection
Process, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EIGHTIES 50, 54-64 (R. Goldwin ed. 1980).
78. Id at 55.
79. Orren, supra note 51, at 31-32 (raising general constitutional questions).
80. Id
81. Id at 32.
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the heyday of party strength.82 Second, it is highly unlikely that we
will abandon the modem social welfare system to restore party
strength.
83
Third, it is unlikely, no matter how desirable, that party organiza-
tions will again assume the exclusive authority to name candidates. It
was pointed out long ago that the primary election causes decay of the
minority party;84 furthermore, primaries destroy the unity of parties be-
cause primaries draw candidates of every stripe and the party leaders
cannot weed out even those whose views are wholly anathema to the
party's posture. 85 The judiciary has recently created doubts about the
authority of states to impose regulations on party nominating and oper-
ating processes.86 And the Democratic party has sought to restore some
of the influence of party activists in the presidential nominating pro-
cess: 561 members of Congress, state and local public officials, and
party officials were automatically seated as uncommitted delegates in
the 1984 Democratic National Convention.87 Nonetheless, there has
82. See L. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 108-111; F. SoPtAuF, supra note 3, at 68-70, 399;
Sundquist, supra note 59, at 47.
83. See Sundquist, supra note 59, at 47.
84. V.O. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 169-96 (1956).
85. F. SoRAuF, supra note 3, at 212-13.
86. The Supreme Court has held that national party conventions may prescribe and
enforce rules for delegate selection, even in the face of contrary state laws, party rules, or
judicial orders. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981): Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477 (1975). These decisions recognize that political parties are protected by the
First Amendment freedom of association. The Court has, however, recently used these con-
vention cases to uphold a party's rules for selecting persons to fill vacancies in public offices
at the state level against a challenge that the party's procedures excluded nonmembers from
the selection process. Rodriquez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
There are unfolding lines of legal doctrine that may free parties from some of the state-
imposed limitations on their methods of selecting candidates and structuring party affairs.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down a law that would have permitted
candidates to gain access to a party's primary ballot in contravention of a provision of the
state party's charter which limited ballot access to candidates who had received at least 15%
of the delegate votes in the state party convention. Opinion of the Justices, 385 Mass. 1201,
434 N.E.2d 960 (1982). In the case of Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d
548 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933
(1976), the court refused to hold the apportionment of seats in state party organizations and
conventions to a one-person one-vote standard pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.
Instead, the court held that any rational basis for apportionment was sufficient to meet con-
stitutional standards, and suggested that party strength in the electorate would be one ra-
tional basis for delegate apportionment. 525 F.2d at 588. If these theories are developed, it
would strengthen the parties by again allowing them to assert some authority over nomina-
tions and over internal party structure, thus regaining some of the influence lost as a result of
legislative reform of political parties.
87. Cook, Democrats' Rules Weaken Representation, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 749-51
(1982); Smith, Power Shffts South for '84 Democratic Meet, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 351-
52 (1983).
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been very little movement among state and local party leaders to reas-
sert party organization control over the selection of candidates. Many
doubt that the authority to make nominations should be shifted from
the electorate back to the party organization; and many others fear an
adverse public reaction against their party and its candidates if such
steps were taken.
In one area, however, Congress and the state governments have
greatly accelerated the regulation of activities bearing on the vitality of
political parties; and the Supreme Court has gone a long way toward
sustaining those regulations. That area is political finance. To ade-
quately assess the strength and potential of political parties it is neces-
sary to examine the laws regulating political money and to assay
whether in practice these laws have weakened or strengthened the party
organizations.
IV. Parties and Money in the '80's
A. Laws Governing Party Financing of Elections
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its
amendments, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (PECFA),
and a modest body of other statutes are the basic body of law gov-
erning federal election financing. 8 These laws provide, in general, for
the following political financing arrangements: (1) limits on expendi-
tures, where constitutionally permitted, (2) limits on the amounts and
sources of contributions, (3) full disclosure of campaign contributions
and expenditures, and (4) public financing of national political party
conventions, of presidential general election campaigns, and, in part, of
presidential nominating campaigns. The laws provide for their own
enforcement, including the issuance of regulations and advisory opin-
ions and the bringing of civil actions in the courts by the Federal Elec-
tion Commission (FEC).8 9 These same arrangements, in various
combinations, are now found in virtually all of the states.9"
The authority of Congress and the state legislatures to regulate
political finance is limited by the Constitution as interpreted by the
88. For statutory citations to campaign finance regulations, see supra note I.
89. This commentary draws largely on the author's previous exposition of statutory and
judicial regulations of campaign financing. See Adamany, Financing Political Parties in the
United States, in THE CHANGING BRITISH AND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 153-84 (V.
Bogdanor ed. 1984).
90. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS 169-70 (1976).
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Supreme Court.91 This has been an area of vigorous judicial review
and intervention, largely because the Justices have regarded campaign
finance regulations as restricting the First Amendment guarantees of
free expression and association.92
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that the FECA ex-
penditure limits violated the First Amendment.94 The Court found pro-
tected speech and association elements in political contributions.
Nevertheless, the Court held that contributions to candidates and to
organizations, including political action committees, may be limited in
order to avoid the actuality or appearance of corruption.95 Expendi-
tures made in collaboration with candidates-"coordinated expendi-
tures"-are treated as contributions subject to restriction.96 On the
other hand, contributions from or expenditures by candidates for their
own campaigns may not be limited, since a candidate presumably is
not corrupted by the expenditure of his own funds.97 The Court sus-
tained the provisions requiring full disclosure of campaign receipts and
expenditures, although it recognized that disclosure may deter cam-
paign contributions.9
91. The principal judicial doctrines were laid down in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I
(1976). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (expanding First
Amendment rights of corporations to make expenditures for political advocacy in referen-
dum campaigns); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)
(limiting legislative authority to establish contribution limits in referendum campaigns). An
extended treatment of litigation arising from campaign finance practices in the 1980 cam-
paign may be found in Ifshin & Warin, Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, 31 Am. U.
L. REv. 485-550 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23, 64-69; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-86. It is unlaw-
ful for any national bank, corporation or labor organization to make a contribution or ex-
penditure in connection with any election or political office. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1976).
However, these expenditures have gained constitutional protection as a result of the exten-
sion of First Amendment protection to such expenditures in referendum campaigns. Bel-
loti, 435 U.S. at 819-22 (White, J., dissenting). A similar argument might be made that
corporate or union treasury contributions to candidates, which are entirely prohibited by the
same provisions, are constitutionally protected, subject to whatever contribution limits are
established by Congress and sustained by the judiciary. Id For a brief discussion of these
issues, see Adamany, PA4Cs and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 Aiuz. L. REv. 569,
583-88 (1980) and the extensive literature cited therein.
93. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
94. Id at 19-20, 39-59.
95. Id at 16-18, 20-22, 23-38.
96. Id at 46-47 n.66.
97. Id. at 51-54.
98. Id at 64-68. The Court has, however, recognized that unpopular minor parties or
independent candidates might claim exemption from the disclosure requirements if they can
show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors'
names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties." Id at 68-74. The Court's first application of that standard rejected an
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The Court in Buckley also held that the expenditure of public
funds to subsidize political campaigns and party conventions is within
the spending authority of Congress.99 The Court further held, how-
ever, that presidential candidates who accept public subsidies under the
PECFA may be required to abide by expenditure and contribution lim-
its that could not otherwise be constitutionally applied to them.1° °
These limits also affect political party participation in the presidential
race. 01 The statutory limit for general election expenditures in presi-
dential campaigns is set at the public subsidy of $20 million, adjusted
for inflation since 1974;102 in 1980, the statutory limit was $29.4 mil-
lion. 3 Additional expenditures are allowed for accounting and legal
services necessary to comply with the law;"° and further spending, up
to twenty percent of the expenditure limit, is permitted for fundrais-
ing.1°" National political party committees are permitted to make coor-
dinated expenditures on behalf of their presidential candidate of
amounts not exceeding two cents per voting age person, adjusted for
inflation since 1974.106 In 1980, national party committees were per-
mitted to make up to $4.6 million in coordinated expenditures.
10 7
There are two other avenues of party expenditure in presidential
campaigns. First, parties may spend unlimited amounts to develop
general campaign themes, promote issues, or appeal for support for the
party ticket.'0 8 Second, state and local party organizations have been
authorized by the 1979 amendments to the FECA to make unlimited
expenditures for certain grassroots campaign activities.'09 Both of
"unduly narrow view of the minor party exemption" and permitted exemption from disclo-
sure where there was evidence of sweeping government surveillance and harassment of mi-
nor party activists. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87
(1982).
99. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91-93.
100. Id at 88-89, 99, 107-09; Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487
F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
101. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280
(S.D.N.Y.), a-'d, 445 U.S. 955 (1980). For a critical comment on the result, see Nicholson,
Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations as Unconstitutional Conditions, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 601 (1983).
102. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(B), (C) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
103. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION 110 (1983).
104. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(vii) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
105. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(vi) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
106. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c), (d)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
107. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 297.
108. The Supreme Court has limited the scope of the FECA's spending limits to "ex-
penditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate for federal office." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1975).
109. 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(B)(iv), (viii), (ix) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
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these additional opportunities for party spending were substantially
used in 1980.
From one perspective, the special authorization for political party
spending on behalf of presidential candidates appears to strengthen the
role of party organizations since no other person or group can make
such expenditures. From another perspective, however, the special au-
thorization for party spending is unimpressive. Because the Supreme
Court has invalidated limits on spending, persons and groups who are
independent of the presidential candidate are not bound by his agree-
ment to limit expenditures as a condition for receiving public money. 0
In 1980, individuals and nonparty committees made $13.7 million in
independent expenditures to influence the nomination and election
campaigns for President."' Eleven million dollars was spent in the
general election,"12 and was thus in direct competition with the efforts
of the political parties to elect their nominees. The Republicans were
the overwhelming beneficiaries of independent expenditures, with
$12.5 million of the total spent to support Republican candidates and
another $737,000 spent to oppose Democrats."
3
Party expenditures, although restricted to amounts well below the
level of independent expenditures, may nonetheless be valuable to can-
didates because they may be spent in collaboration with campaign or-
ganizations. In 1980, however, the independent expenditure groups
generally developed campaign themes consistent with those empha-
sized by the presidential and congressional candidates.' There is
some evidence that the Republican party campaign managers engaged
in regular information sharing with the managers of independent ex-
penditure committees," 5 thus promoting unified efforts on behalf of
Republican candidates.
Political parties appear to have received favorable treatment in the
drafting of the FECA's contribution limits. An individual may give up
to $5,000 in any calendar year to a nonparty committee. By contrast,
individuals may contribute up to $20,000 annually to political party
committees, and nonparty committees may give up to $15,000 to party
110. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54-59. For a critical comment on the effects of this aspect
of the Court's decision in Buckley, see Claude & Kirchhoff, The "Free Market" of Ideas,
Independent Expenditures, and Influence, 57 N.D. L. REV. 337, 339-66 (1981).
111. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Study Shows Independent Expenditures Top S16 Mil-
lion, Press Release 1 (Nov. 29, 1981).
112. Id.
113. Id. at3.
114. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 387-402; E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY
135-43 (1983).
115. E. DREW, supra note 114, at 136.
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organizations.1 1 6
Party committees are also given preference over individuals and
nonparty committees in the amounts they may contribute and spend to
directly assist candidates. Individuals may give up to $1,000 to candi-
dates in each primary election and each general election;1 7 nonparty
committees may contribute up to $5,000 to candidates."1 By contrast,
in Senate races, the national political party committees may contribute
$17,500.11 Vastly more important, national party committees may
make coordinated expenditures in Senate races in the amount of
$20,000 or two cents per voting age person in the state, subject to infla-
tionary adjustment. 20 In 1982, permissible coordinated expenditures
were $655,900 in California, the nation's largest state, and $36,880 in
the nation's smallest jurisdictions.1 2' In states with only a single mem-
ber of the House of Representatives, the limit in House campaigns is
the same as for the United States Senate,1 22 generally $36,800. 123 In
other states, the limit is $10,000, adjusted for inflation; 24 in 1982, this
amount was $18,400.125
The FECA also permits state and local party committees together
to make coordinated expenditures of two cents per voting age person in
Senate races and to expend an amount equal to the national party com-
mittee outlays in races for the House of Representatives.126 In practice,
however, state and local party committees have been only modestly in-
volved in making coordinated expenditures.2 7 The Republican state
party committees have designated the national party organization as
their "agent" for coordinated expenditures purposes, thus effectively
doubling national party coordinated expenditures on behalf of candi-
dates. This practice was challenged by the FEC and the Democratic
Senate Campaign Committee, but was upheld by the Supreme
Court.'
28
116. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (2) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
117. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1980).-
118. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
119. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
120. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c), (d)(3)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
121. Sabato, PACs, Parties, and Independent Groups, in THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS OF
1982, at 74 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1983).
122. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c), (d)(3)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
123. Sabato, supra note 121, at 74.
124. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c), (d)(3)(B) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
125. Sabato, supra note 121, at 74.
126. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c), (d)(3).
127. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 91.
128. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27
(1981).
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As in presidential contests, independent expenditure committees
can spend unlimited sums to support or oppose candidates for Con-
gress. In 1980, these expenditures totalled $2.3 million in congressional
races.'2 9 Republicans were the primary beneficiaries: $643,000 was
spent to advocate election of their candidates, while $318,000 was spent
on behalf of Democratic candidates. 30 In contrast to the $1.3 million
spent to urge the defeat of Democratic candidates, a mere $57,000 was
spent to attack their Republican opponents.
1 3 1
In 1982, independent expenditures in congressional races reached
$5.7 million, an increase of 146 percent from 1980.132 Again, Republi-
cans were the principal beneficiaries of these expenditures, although
their massive advantage dwindled slightly as liberal PACs came to the
aid of Democrats. More than $790,000 was spent to advocate the elec-
tion of Republican congressional candidates, while $4.0 million was
spent to attack their Democratic opponents.133 Independent expendi-
tures on behalf of Democrats totaled $368,800, while outlays to oppose
Republicans were $550,000.134 The strategy of independent expendi-
ture committees to devote their resources to negative campaigning thus
persisted in 1982.
Independent expenditures were heavily concentrated in a small
number of committees: the top ten spending groups accounted for $5.2
million of total outlays of $5.7 million.1 35 The National Conservative
Political Action Committee (NCPAC) continued to be the top in-
dependent spender with outlays of $3.2 million. 36 Only two of the top
ten independent expenditure committees could be regarded as "liberal"
in orientation, and their expenditures were merely $272,000.137 Two
trade association committees were also among the top ten, each spend-
ing approximately $200,000.138 Six of the top ten PACs, accounting for
roughly $4.5 million, were conservative organizations.
39
129. FEC Study, supra note 111, at 4.
130. Id
131. Id
132. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Issues Final Report on 1981-82 Independent Spending,
Press Release 1 (Mar. 22, 1983). See also Cohen, Giving Till It Hurts: 1982 Campaign
Prompts New Look at Financing Races, 14 NAT'L J. 2144-53 (1982).
133. FEC Issues Final Report, supra note 132, at 6.
134. Id





In 1979, Congress greatly expended the opportunity for local and
state political party organizations to participate in the financing of
campaigns for federal office. Unlimited coordinated expenditures by
state and local party committees are now permitted for three types of
activity: slate cards or sample ballots listing three or more candidates
recommended by the party organization; registration and get-out-the-
vote activities, except mass media advertising, conducted on behalf of
presidential and vice presidential candidates; and campaign materials
such as handbills, brochures, posters, stickers, signs, and so forth, but
excluding mass media advertising, on behalf of any federal office
candidate. 140
The magnitude of these grassroots expenditures in 1980 is not
known. According to FEC reports, Republican state and local party
expenditures on behalf of federal office candidates in 1980 were
$837,300, and comparable Democratic party outlays were $375,000.11
It is estimated, however, that actual outlays by state and local party
committees were $15 million on the Republican side and $4 million by
the Democratic camp.'
42
It is apparent that state and local party expenditures for grassroots
campaigning and for mobilizing voters will increase. In view of the
limitations on national party committee spending in both presidential
and congressional campaigns, the unlimited spending authorization in
the 1979 FECA amendments is a powerful incentive for candidates and
national party activists to assist local and state party organizations to
raise funds. Furthermore, the FECA permits unlimited transfers of
funds between national, state, and local party committees. 143 National
party committees can transfer funds, which cannot be designated for
candidate support to state and local party committees which may use
them for grassroots campaigning on behalf of federal office candidates
and for mobilizing voters.
Independent expenditure committees can spend unlimited
amounts of money for all of these same purposes. In addition, the
FECA specifically permits labor unions and other organizations to
communicate with their members, and corporations to communicate
with stockholders and executive/administrative personnel, for the pur-
pose of advocating the election or defeat of candidates.'" Nonpartisan
140. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iv), (viii), (ix) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
141. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final Figures on 1979-80 Major Political Party
Activipy, Press Release 3 (Feb. 21, 1982) (corrected release).
142. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 299.
143. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(A)(4) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
144. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
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registration and get-out-the-vote activities are exempt from FECA ex-
penditure rules.
1 45
Public financing of campaigns146 is the newest and most controver-
sial element in American national policy for regulating politics. At the
national level, subsidies of $3 million are provided to the major polit-
ical parties to pay the costs of national presidential nominating conven-
tions.14 Adjusted for inflation, this subsidy amounted to $4.4 million
in 1980.141 Public financing of national conventions relieves the parties
of costs they formerly bore, allowing them to use their funds to support
candidates or engage in party-building activities.
A candidate seeking the presidential nomination of a major party
is eligible for public support of his campaign. To qualify for public
financing a candidate must raise $5,000 in each of twenty states
through contributions from individuals in amounts not exceeding $250;
candidates are then eligible to have contributions in the amount of
$250 or less matched by federal funds. 49 An overall spending limit of
$10 million is imposed as a condition for receiving public funds. 5 '
Adjusted for inflation, this amount was $14.7 million in 1980.1'1 State
by state expenditure limits are prescribed within the national spending
ceiling. 152 The law also provides that a candidate's eligibility for public
subsidies terminates thirty days after the second successive primary in
which he receives less than ten percent of the vote; eligibility may be
renewed if he receives twenty percent or more of the vote in a subse-
quent primary.1
5 3
Opponents of this public subsidy scheme argue that it reduces reli-
ance by presidential candidates on traditional party activists. 154 The
party may still be important, however, because a broad fundraising
base is necessary in order to trigger matching grants. Moreover, the
American party organizations have historically not been involved in
prenomination contests. A more plausible complaint is that public
campaign subsidies have encouraged states to adopt the primary sys-
145. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ii) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
146. See, e.g., Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-02,
85 Stat. 562 (1971) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
147. Id at §§ 9008(a), (b).
148. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 267.
149. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9033(b), 9034(a).
150. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(A), (c) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
151. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 136. An additional $3 million was allowed for
fundraising expenses pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9)(B)(vi) (1976).
152. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(A) (1976).
153. 26 U.S.C. § 9033(c)(1)(B), (4)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
154. Ranney, supra note 2, at 242; J. KIRKPATRiCK, supra note 2, at 14.
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tern, thus diminishing the role of state and local party leaders in select-
ing presidential nominees. The trend toward primaries was, however,
already strong before the advent of public financing of nomination
campaigns.1
55
Public funding of general election campaigns is said to weaken the
link between candidates and party organizations by relieving office-
seekers from virtually all dependence on party committees. 15 6 This ar-
gument is somewhat weakened by the authorization for parties to make
coordinated expenditures and to engage in general political advertising
stressing issues or partisan affiliation. Moreover, the 1979 amendments
give state and local parties wide scope to directly support presidential
candidates; the FECA's authorization for unlimited transfers between
party committees invites the national party organizations to be substan-
tially involved in financing state and local campaign activities.
The absolute prohibition on private contributions to presidential
campaigns creates an opportunity for parties to win financial support
from interested citizens who would otherwise give to presidential can-
didates. There is evidence, however, that independent expenditure
committees have been quicker and more adroit in exploiting this possi-
bility; they have solicited contributions by claiming that they are per-
mitted to campaign directly for the candidate since they are not subject
to the candidate's spending limit.157 A number of commentators have
urged that presidential candidates be authorized to receive small indi-
vidual contributions in order to encourage public participation and to
weaken the appeal of independent expenditure groups. 15 8 But this
would not aid the parties. Instead, it might further attenuate the party's
role in presidential elections by allowing greater concentration of finan-
cial resources in the presidential candidate's campaign apparatus.
The importance of party affiliation in American politics is height-
ened because eligibility for public financing is dependent on the status
of a candidate's political party.'59 Major parties receive the full statu-
tory subsidy. Minor parties receive a proportional subsidy, and new
parties may receive a post-election grant if they gain enough votes.
155. THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS OF 1980, at 369 (A. Ranney ed. 1981).
156. Ranney, supra note 2, at 242.
157. Democratic National Committee Task Force on Independent Expenditures, LIB-
ERTY OR LOOPHOLE: INDEPENDENT ExPENDITURE COMMITrEES IN FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS 40-42 (1982).
158. See, e.g., Adamany, Letters, 6 REGULATION 2 (1982); Note, Independent Political
Committees and the Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. Rv. 955, 988-99 (1981).
159. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9002(6), (7), (8), § 9004(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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In a provision which does not bear directly on political parties, the
FECA authorizes unions, corporations, and trade associations to estab-
lish political action committees, to expend treasury funds to administer
these committees, to use treasury money to solicit certain employees or
members for contribution to PACs, to engage in nonpartisan registra-
tion and get-out-the-vote drives, and to advocate support for candi-
dates among shareholders, members, and employees.' 60 The funds
raised by political action committees can be contributed directly to can-
didates, up to a limit of $5,000 in each election. Christopher Arterton
has observed that:
[T]he most detrimental aspects of the [FECA] for political parties
come about through the advantages open to institutional compet-
itors. For example, over the past five elections, congressional
candidates have become increasingly dependent upon funds
channeled through political action committees. . . . At the gov-
erning stage, they are real competitors to parties for influence
upon the behavior of public officeholders.
16
Political action committees in the aggregate now exceed parties in the
amount contributed to candidates. 62 PACs also spend about the same
amount as parties on direct efforts to influence voter choices among
candidates.
163
The FECA is not the sole cause of the new muscle of PACs. Non-
connected committees, mainly ideological or issue-oriented groups un-
connected with economic institutions, raise most of their funds through
mass mail appeals and devote most of their campaign-related expendi-
tures to mass media or mass mail efforts urging support or opposition
to specific candidates. Their activities in fundraising and advocacy are
possible because of modem technology. Their authorization is embed-
ded not in the FECA, but in Supreme Court decisions extending First
Amendment protection to independent expenditures.
Corporate political action committees have experienced the great-
est growth in money and numbers, and it is the corporate PACs that
have the greatest potential for further growth.164 The FECA's authori-
zation for corporations and unions to establish the PACs, use treasury
funds for administration and solicitation, contribute to candidates
160. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
161. Arterton, PoliticalMoney andParty Strength, in THE FUTuRE OF AMERICAN POLIT-
ICAL PARTIES: THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE 101, 118-19 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982).
162. Adamany, supra note 89, at 175.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 282-85.
164. E. Epstein, PACs and the Modem Political Process (paper delivered at the 1982
Conference on the Impact of the Modem Corporation).
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through PACs, and engage in candidate advocacy is the principal cause
of the emergence of these formidable competitors to political parties.
B. The Financial Vitality of Political Parties
Despite forecasts of party decline, America's political parties now
show greater financial vitality than at any time since World War II.
Indeed, they are probably financially stronger now than at any time in
this century.
In 1969-70, the Republican National Committee (RNC) reported
revenues of $18 million, a sum that astonished the nation's leading
commentator on political finance. 65 The Democrats raised and spent
considerably less. 166 During the 1972 campaign, national Republican
party committees apparently spent $8.3 million on presidential and
congressional campaigns, while the Democrats were credited with
spending roughly $4.8 million.167 This was in the election year that
marked the transition to the FECA, which has subsequently been criti-
cized as being responsible for the ruin of political parties.
After eight years under the FECA, the Republican national com-
mittees raised $130.3 million in the 1979-80 election cycle, while their
Democratic counterparts had receipts of $23 million. 68 In the "off
year" 1982 election cycle, the national parties raised even greater sums.
In the 1981-82 period, Republican national committees raised $191.0
million and their Democratic rivals raised $31.7 milion.
169
The financial health of state and local parties is not as easily esti-
mated. Fewer than 600 of an estimated 7300 party committees at the
local, state, and national levels come within the financial reporting pro-
visions of the FECA. These undoubtedly include a preponderance of
the committees with substantial financial activity. State and local Re-
publican party committees reporting to the FEC had net receipts of
$33.8 million in 1979-80; comparable Democratic party organizations
had net receipts of $9.1 million. 170 In 1981-82 Republican state and
local committees reported to the FEC that they had received $23.9 mil-
lion, while their Democratic counterparts reported receipts of $7.6 mil-
165. H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 111 (1972).
166. Id at 116.
167. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION 84-90 (1976).
168. FECReleasesFinalFi'ures, upra note 141, at 2. These figures exclude $5.1 million
received by the Democrats and $5.4 million received by the Republicans under the Presiden-
tial Election Campaign Fund Act to subsidize the national party conventions.
169. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Final Reportfor 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Out-
spent Democrats 5 to 1, Press Release 2 (Apr. 26, 1983).
170. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141, at 2.
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lion.17 A further bit of evidence that state and local party committees
have become financially stronger is that average state party budgets in
sixteen states increased from $188,000 in the mid-1960's to $341,000 in
the late 1970's.172
National, state, and local party committees subject to federal re-
porting requirements accounted for approximately $32.3 million, or
twenty-four percent, of total expenditures of $136 million in 1972 cam-
paigns for federal office. 173 A preliminary estimate indicates that ex-
penditures of $740 million were made in 1980 by presidential and
congressional candidates and their supporters, political action commit-
tees, and political parties. 74 The $196.8 million in net disbursements
by national, state, and local party committees in 1980 represents a max-
imum of twenty-eight percent of total political expenditures for federal
candidates and by federally-registered committees. 175 Allowing for
some unevenness in the figures, party roles of twenty-four percent of
total spending in 1972 as the FECA was taking effect, and twenty-eight
percent in 1980, after it was well-established, certainly do not constitute
evidence of party decay resulting from enactment of the present federal
campaign finance laws. It also does not indicate significant party revi-
talization, although the uses of party money may support that
conclusion. 176
The vitality of national Republican party financing has been made
possible by advances in technology, the party's investment in fundrais-
mng, and its stable central office bureaucracy. Beginning in the early
1970's, the Republicans made systematic party appeals on behalf of the
Republican Sustaining Fund to those individuals who had made small
contributions to GOP presidential candidates. 177 In 1980, aided by a
special postal subsidy granted to the parties by Congress in late 1978,
the Republican National Committee (RNC) had a contribution base of
1.2 million persons. 178 The RNC raised about eighty percent of its
171. FEC Final Report for 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats 5 to 1,
supra note 169, at 2.
172. See J. Gibson, C. Cotter, J. Bibby, & R. Huckshorn, supra note 49, at 19.
173. This figure is inexact because of inconsistency of reporting. The calculations are
based on data in H. ALEXANDER, supra note 167, at 78, 84, 86, 96.
174. This estimate is based on data in H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 104.
175. Party spending includes federal grants for the operation of national party conven-
tions. The data is derived from FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141.
176. See infra part IV C.
177. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 711-12 (1979).
178. Cf. Clark, The RNC Prospers, the DNC Struggles as They Face the 1980 Elections,
12 NAT'L J. 1617, 1618 (1980) (RNC papers offer estimate of expected base); REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 1981 CHAIRMAN'S REPORT 12-13, 22-23, 31-32 (1981).
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funds through mass mail appeals, relying on gifts averaging only
$29.179 The National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC)
relied even more heavily on small gifts, receiving ninety percent of its
receipts from 300,000 contributions averaging $23.180 By 1981 national
Republican committees had contacted forty million households with
fund appeals and had an active contributor list estimated between 1.7
million and 2.1 million.''
The remarkable information storage and retrieval capacities of
computers were necessary for the enormously successful building of the
Republican contributor base. Also essential for the GOP's success was
the party's willingness to invest in "prospecting" for contributors, staff
and equipment, and mail appeals. An extended period of investment
and development was possible because the Republican national party
organizations had relatively stable leadership and professional staff to
carry out a consistent, long-term plan to build up the party's financial
capacity.1
8 2
The Republicans also continued to seek money from large donors,
although the definition of "large donors" has been revised downward
since 1972 when the Republican presidential candidate received gifts of
$50,000 or more from 153 individuals.8 3 The Republican Eagles Pro-
gram, which seeks $10,000 gifts, increased from 198 persons in 1975 to
865 in 1980.184 The "Victory '80" program, soliciting contributions of
$500, $1,000, or $2,500, raised more than $1 million.8 5 A convention
gala and a network of nineteen party dinners during the 1980 general
election campaign raised more than $4 million, which was shared with
state and local parties.18 6 A special PAC 40 Club raised sums of $5,000
from more than forty political action committees. 187 In 1980, NRCC's
National Leadership Council had more than 400 members, each of
179. Clark, supra note 178, at 1618.
180. Cohen, Democrats Take a Leaf from GOP Book with Eary Campaign Financing
Start, 13 NAT'L J. 920, 923 (1981).
181. Kayden, Parties and the 1980 Presidential Election, in FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ONGOING EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGN LAWS UPON THE CONDUCT OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 6.11 (C. Arterton ed.
1982); Sabato, supra note 121, at 75.
182. On stability in the national party bureaucracies, see Adamany, Political Parties in
the 1980s, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN
THE 1980's (M. Malbin ed. 1983).
183. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 167, at 370-99.
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whom contributed $2,500 or more. '88 The National Republican Sena-
torial Committee (NRSC) was supported by a 4000-member Business
Advisory Board, consisting of contributors of $250 to $750, and by the
Senate Republican Trust, a group of corporate executives who contrib-
ute $10,000 annually.'8 9
National Democratic fundraising has been vastly less impressive.
Incumbency in the White House and in Congress hindered party efforts
because those in control of the government were able to go directly to
individual large contributors and to PACs to raise campaign funds. 190
Moreover, the advantages of incumbency-including staff, the postal
frank, and readily available radio and television studios-made the
need for party fundraising and support services substantially less ur-
gent for Democrats than for Republicans.
Until 1982, the Democrats carried heavy indebtedness from their
financial debacle in 1968, and were unable to invest in the technology
and prospecting activities essential to build a small contributor base.' g9
Furthermore, the party's coalition character meant that candidates
reached out to political action committees, various ideological constitu-
encies, and other fund sources that were not party oriented. Finally,
the rapid turnover of leadership in the Democratic National Commit-
tee (DNC) and the DNC's subservience to short-term White House
political goals during the Carter presidency prevented long-term com-
mitment to party-building and fundraising activities.'92
An entirely different concern is whether the Democrats have the
capacity to develop a base of small contributors sufficient to provide
substantial funding.'
93
The differences in demographics between the two parties may ul-
timately affect the ability of the Democrats to raise sums compa-
rable to the Republicans. Since the traditional constituencies of
the Democratic party are not generally affluent, direct mail fun-
draising may never be as successful for them as it has been for the
Republicans, even though the Democrats currently have a larger
pool of potential supporters. Despite the fact that the average
direct mail contribution is quite small, research on contribution
patterns reveals that income is directly and strongly related to
188. Id.
189. Id at 76-77.
190. Arterton, supra note 161, at 109-110.
191. Adamany, supra note 89, at 167-68. See also Democrats Pay Off'68 Debt But GOP
Has Money Edge, Wash. Post, June 6, 1982, at A2, col. 1.
192. Adamany, supra note 182, at 86; Arterton, supra note 161, at 109-110; Kayden,
supra note 181, at 6.19-6.20.
193. See generally Adamany, supra note 182, at 105-06.
political giving.' 94
There is some history of Democratic success in mass fundraising.
Both the McGovern and McCarthy campaigns won support from large
numbers of contributors; 195 their campaign rosters, however, were not
properly maintained and were not fully shared with the party organiza-
tion.' 96 From 1972 through 1975 the Democratic National Committee
sponsored four telethons, which raised $17.1 million in average gifts
between $11 and $15. The most successful attracted contributions from
390,000 people. 97 It is argued, in any case, that since more than eighty
million Americans identify themselves in the polls as Democrats, very
low levels of participation-between 1.5 and 2 percent of party identifi-
ers-would still allow the Democratic party to establish as large a con-
tributor base as the Republicans.
In 1981, leaders of the DNC and the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee made commitments to invest modestly in mass
mailings and to reinvest the resulting revenues to expand their small
contributor base. They raised $2.7 million from mass mail appeals and
reinvested $2.1 million in further appeals. 198 One commentator con-
cluded that in 1982 "the Democrats demonstrated the self-discipline
necessary to developing a successful direct mail program by reinvesting
the proceeds of early 'prospecting' mailings into additional solicita-
tions; and the party's list of contributors consequently increased from
25,000 in 1981 to more than 220,000 by the end of 1982."'199 By late
1983, the DNC's contribution list had grown to 324,000.200 Nonethe-
less, the Democrats still remain heavily reliant on PAC contributions,
which increased markedly in 1982 as labor unions decided that they
must take an interest in rebuilding the Democratic national organiza-
tion,20 I and in obtaining large individual gifts.
The conclusion that emerges from a review of contemporary party
financing is that technology, investment, and stable organization per-
194. Arterton, supra note 161, at 110.
195. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1968 ELECTION 44 (1971); H. ALEXANDER, supra
note 167, at 293-94.
196. Adamany, supra note 182, at 96.
197. Ellwood & Spitzer, The Democratic National Telethons Their Strengths and Fail-
ures, 41 J. POL. 828-64 (1979); H. ALEXANDER, supra note 177, at 396.
198. Cook, Democrats Develop Tactics: Laying Groundwork for 1984, 40 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1591, 1595 (1982).
199. Sabato, supra note 121, at 83.
200. MoUison, M1anatt Helps Organize Distraught Democrats, Detroit Free Press, Nov.
16, 1983, at 8C, col. 1.
201. B. Edsall, Labor is Becoming Financial Mfainstay of Democratic Committee, Wash.
Post, Sept. 19, 1981, at A3, col. 1.
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mitted the Republican party to attain the greatest financial strength in
modem political history. For the first time a political party's finances
have been solidly based primarily on widespread support from millions
of contributors of small amounts. The Democrats have similar pros-
pects, although they remain to be tested. The FECA has not been a bar
to the remarkable revitalization of party financial strength. Even
though the FECA has prohibited large contributions, it has not pre-
vented the parties from seeking substantial sums from both individuals
and political action committees.
One may argue that parties could be further strengthened by in-
creasing or eliminating the contribution limits. For the Democrats, this
would purportedly provide an opportunity to raise enough investment
money to develop a mass fundraising program competitive with the
successful Republican system. But it might also sap the party's will to
shift from large gifts to a great many small contributions. Ultimately,
the lifting of contribution limits would disproportionately advantage
the Republicans. They have always raised more money from large
contributors, and they continue to win the support of most of the very
wealthy and of the upper middle classes.
Even if both parties' finances would be strengthened by eliminat-
ing or increasing contribution limits, valid purposes of the FECA
would be defeated by such amendments. First, the contribution limits
were intended to diminish the corruption that has often accompanied
large contributions. It is true that contributions to parties are not as
directly corrupting as those to candidates; nonetheless, they do have
corruptive potential, especially if increased party financing would
strengthen the influence of party organizations in policymaking and
governance. Second, the contribution limits were an attempt to in-
crease the equality of citizens in elections. The equality of the vote is
seriously diluted by rampant inequality in resources or influence in the
processes leading up to elections.2 "2 No form of political activity lends
itself to greater inequality than contributing money, and any substan-
tial loosening of existing contribution limits would reintroduce this ele-
ment of inequality into the political process.2 °3
202. See, eg., Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to Campaign Finance Re-
form, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 679 (1983).
203. See Adamany, supra note 92, at 570-7 1; H. ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 9 (1976);
D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 2-4 (1975).
C. Party Money and Party Activities
Structuring the Vote and Political Socialization. The revitalization
of party funding has permitted some party efforts that are clearly in-
tended to structure the vote along party lines and has allowed other
efforts that indirectly may have that effect. Most unexpected was the
advent of "institutional advertising"--that is, party-sponsored advertis-
ing promoting the party and its themes without mentioning specific
candidates. This initiative was due in part to the FECA's limits on
party contributions to candidates and on coordinated expenditures by
parties on behalf of candidates. Having reached these legal limits, the
Republican party attempted to find additional ways to promote candi-
dates. Their decision was straightforward: advertise the party and
party themes, thereby indirectly assisting the candidates on the party
ticket.
In 1980, the national Republican committees spent $9.4 million" 4
on a nationwide television campaign featuring six different messages
attacking Democratic "failures" in the areas of inflation, unemploy-
ment, energy, national security, and government spending. The most
visible advertisement featured a look-alike for House Speaker Tip
O'Neil and focussed discontent with Democratic policies through him.
These campaign commercials emphasized party voting by consistently
closing with the slogan "Vote Republican. For a Change."20 5 Republi-
can polls showed a high recollection of these advertisements. 6
In 1982, the Republicans sponsored party-oriented commercials
urging voters to "stay the course" and claiming that President Reagan
had increased social security benefits.2 07 The RNC also sponsored a
weekly radio address by the President, which reached both listeners to
the program and those who read or heard about the President's views
as reported in the media. The GOP institutional advertising campaign,
which stretched from late spring through election day, cost $15 mil-
lion.20 8 Even more unusual was the Republicans' $2.3 million televi-
sion campaign in the 1981 non-election year. It praised the President's
success in enacting his budget and tax measures and featured the
204. Adamany, supra note 182 ($9.4 million); H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 310
($9.5 million).
205. Robinson, The Media in 1980: Was the Message the Message?, in THE AMERICAN
ELECTIONS OF 1980, 185-86 (A. Ranney ed. 1981); Clark, supra note 178, at 1620; Adamany,
supra note 182, at 82.
206. Adamany, supra note 182, at 82.
207. Sabato, supra note 121, at 78.
208. Id at 77.
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theme: "Republicans-Leadership That Works for a Change. 2 °9
The Democrats' party-oriented campaign was smaller, involving
only about $1 million in 1982.210 It gave more emphasis to striking at
the Republicans than to the Democratic party and its themes. In one
advertisement a Republican elephant rampaged through a china shop,
trampling social programs such as social security. In another, a Balti-
more factory worker who had been featured in Republican ads in 1980
recanted his previous support of the GOP and reported that many of
his fellows had suffered unemployment because of the Reagan
programs. 11
Both parties made efforts to structure and mobilize the vote
through grassroots campaigning and registration and get-out-the-vote
drives. Such activities have long been performed by the parties. With
the emergence of significant financial strength in the Republican na-
tional party, the sponsorship of these grassroots campaign efforts has
been shifting from their traditional locus in ward, town, and city com-
mittees to the national party organizations. The 1979 amendments to
the FECA authorized local party committees to engage in unlimited
expenditures for grassroots campaigning; the FECA's provision al-
lowing unlimited transfers of funds between party committees permit-
ted the RNC to fund the local committees' efforts. Although it is
difficult to pinpoint the actual sums involved, several commentators be-
lieve that in 1980 the Republican National Committee was responsible
for providing $9 million to local party committees for grassroots
campaigning, either by direct intraparty transfers or by channeling
money from contributors to strategically located local party units.212
The cost of Republican state and local grassroots campaign activities to
aid candidates for federal office in 1980 has been estimated at $15 mil-
lion, while similar Democratic activities have been calculated at $4
million.
2 13
In 1980, the RNC spent approximately $1 million to conduct a
voter registration, identification, and get-out-the-vote program called
"Commitment '80." The RNC claims that between 800,000 and one
209. Id
210. Id at 85.
211. Id; Broder, Dixie the Elephant is Smashing in Democratic Party 4d Debut, Wash.
Post, Sept. 15, 1983, at A15, col. 1.
212. Kayden, supra note 181, at 6.16. One estimate puts 1980 local and state party
spending on behalf of the Republican presidential candidate at $15 million. H. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 103, at 113. Of this sum, $9 million was reported to have been "channelled"
by Republican party operatives directly from contributors to state and local party commit-
tees. Id at 302; E. DREW, supra note 114, at 105, 109.
213. Alexander, supra note 103, at 113-14.
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million people were involved in some grassroots activity, 100,000 vol-
unteers hosted parties in their homes to get the massive voter drive un-
derway, 85,000 volunteers participated in training and leadership
meetings to give direction to these efforts, and 700,000 or more voters
were registered. 1 4
In 1980, the Democratic National Committee reportedly registered
about 1.1 million new Democratic voters in fifteen states at a cost of
$750,000 and made phone contacts with 5 million voters in twenty-two
states at a cost of about $600,000.215 More than two-thirds of these
calls were principally of a vote structuring character because they
urged support for the Democratic ticket. The remainder were get-out-
the-vote reminders. The scope and success of this program has been
doubted by some familiar with the DNC operation.2 16
Some party expenditures could be characterized as vote structur-
ing activities, but their relationship to vote structuring is at best indi-
rect. Both parties, for example, have made substantial efforts to put
research, radio and television commercials, and other information at
the disposal of candidates and their managers.2z 7 Both parties issue
press releases targeted to districts in which opposition party officehold-
ers are thought to be vulnerable on the issues.2 1 8 The training of cam-
paign staffs has been said to indirectly influence campaign activities by
bringing the staff in closer coordination with the party's position.21
Yet most of these activities focus attention on candidates or officehold-
214. Clark, supra note 178, at 1620; Adamany, supra note 182, at 83. One commentator
has said that "whether those [800,000] volunteers later went out into the neighborhoods is
questionable." Kayden, supra note 181, at 6.12. She does not attribute this to financial or
organizational failure, but rather to changes in American society which already have made
the old-style party organizations obsolete. "Most believe the kinds of grassroots activities
called for in the [Commitment '80] program were no longer functional and no amount of
money or planning could alter that fact. . . . Explanations reflect the changed nature of
American society from the days when such activities were more common: people no longer
welcome strangers at the door, nor are they eager to knock on strange doors; in a great many
households all adults are employed outside the house and when they are at home, they are
less eager to have interruptions than they might have been in the past. . . . Changes in
communication technology. . . have eliminated the need for door-to-door activities: direct
mail and paid media enable the party--or any other group--to communicate directly and
fully with voters in a far more sophisticated and complete manner than volunteer message
carriers, however well-trained and articulate." Id at 6.13.
215. L. Francis, The Democratic National Committee and the 1980 Elections (1981) (re-
port presented to the Democratic National Committee).
216. See Adamany, supra note 182, at 91.
217. Arterton, supra note 161, at 128; Sabato, supra note 121, at 76-77, 84; Roberts, Par-
ties' Outlook: Distinctly National, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at A28, col. 3.
218. Sabato, supra note 121, at 77, 84.
219. Arterton, supra note 161, at 128.
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ers rather than on the party as a whole; in this respect, the parties are
actually widening the public's perceived gap between the relevance of
political parties and of candidates to issues and governance.
A case can be made that both parties are extending their efforts in
citizen socialization toward politics. Certainly the massive mail ap-
peals for money are attempts to persuade citizens to participate in polit-
ical affairs. The high response to these appeals might be regarded as
success by parties in persuading people to become involved in politics.
Similarly, the programs to mobilize volunteers, as in "Commitment
'80," are party efforts to involve citizens in political affairs regardless
whether the mobilization activities are actually successful in controlling
or delivering the votes in the precincts.
Notwithstanding these efforts, there is reason to doubt that mod-
em party campaign activities do very much to structure the vote or to
promote political socialization. The parties' "institutional advertising"
has a distinctly negative quality, blaming the opposition or accusing
them on emotional issues. Mass mail fund appeals tend to have the
same character: they are less party-oriented than issue-specific, and
they generally exploit issues that engender or play on fear or hostility.
While these activities may influence voting, it is doubtful that they
transmit political values, an understanding of a party's platform, or an
awareness of a candidate's views on the issues of the day.
It has been established that there is less party-line voting than
before, that fewer voters think of themselves as partisans, and that
there is less connection between party labels and the vote.220 It appears
that modern campaign activities do little to extend citizens' political
knowledge or involvement or to structure the vote. A desirable contri-
bution of parties to American politics has been diminished. The rela-
tionship of campaign finance laws and practices to this loss, however, is
minimal.
Recruitment of Political Activists. In contrast to the parties' small
role in vote structuring and political socialization, parties may signifi-
cantly influence candidate recruitment. This is clearest in the affluent
Republican national party. Republican recruitment efforts have had
three distinct elements: (1) investing funds in state campaigns to pro-
mote the fortunes of aspiring candidates who would later be in position
to run for Congress; (2) assuring substantial "start up" funds for candi-
dates for the House and Senate; and (3) providing campaign services to
candidates. The Democrats have lacked the financial resources to sig-
220. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
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nificantly engage in these activities. The Democrats have also had less
incentive to engage in major recruitment activities because prior to
1982 they held substantial majorities in both houses of Congress and
could afford the luxury of an "incumbent preservation" strategy.
The parties have been stimulated to strengthen their candidate
recruiting activities by an important body of scholarship suggesting
complex links between the attractiveness of specific candidates, the mo-
bilization of political resources, and election outcomes.221 These find-
ings tend to displace theories that congressional races are largely
ordained by presidential coattails in the presidential election years and
by voter satisfaction with presidential performance, especially presi-
dential management of the economy, in the "off year" elections.
Emerging scholarship suggests that the single most important vari-
able in congressional races is the attractiveness of the challenger, such
as the proven ability to win votes in previous elections, and his or her
ability to mobilize political resources, especially campaign funds. At-
tractive congressional candidates, especially those who have previously
been elected to other offices or who have made strong showings in past
races for Congress, are most likely to come forward if they assess their
prospects for success favorably. An important element in this assess-
ment has always been the President's popularity and the condition of
the economy at the time-usually six months or more before an elec-
tion-when candidates are deciding whether to throw their hats into
the political ring. Another factor is their ability to obtain advance com-
mitments of the political resources, especially money, necessary to
wage strong campaigns.
Those who provide political resources also assess candidates' pros-
pects for success. Only rarely do these political elites contribute re-
sources solely from ideological motivations. They seek a reasonable
degree of certainty that candidates they support have real prospects to
win elections. This especially affects challengers. If their prospects are
not strong, contributors may engage eithe in a strategy of supporting
incumbents, since it is both wasteful and potentially dangerous to sup-
port losing challengers, or in a strategy of foregoing contributions alto-
gether, especially if the incumbent's record is unpalatable.
The evidence is quite persuasive that there is a strong relationship
between a challenger's spending and his prospects of electoral suc-
cess.222 There is no similar correlation between incumbent spending
221. See, e.g, G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); G. JACOB-
SON & S. KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
222. See G. JACOBSON, supra note 221, at 141-57.
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and election day victory. The reason is apparent. Incumbents are rea-
sonably well-known, and voters usually have some generalized and
reasonably well-fixed attitude of support or dislike for them. By con-
trast, challengers tend to be relatively unknown; the availability of
campaign funds allows them to increase their visibility and shape a
favorable image.
It was recently suggested that political parties might break the mu-
tually re-enforcing cycle of calculations by candidates and major con-
tributors.223 The authors of this theory reasoned that "strong parties
might be able to deploy candidates and campaign resources to counter-
act rather than reinforce the effects of national forces."22 4 If funds were
provided to relatively attractive candidates, their prospects would im-
prove even in the face of a grim political and economic climate. Re-
source-providing elites would be drawn in to provide further support
because they would recognize that the disadvantaged party's candi-
dates were running well. The same strategists predicted that because of
strong Republican candidate recruitment, 1982 would not be as good a
year for Democrats as would ordinarily be expected.22 5 In fact, the
Republicans lost only twenty-six seats in the House of Representatives
rather than the roughly forty-five seats that were predicted would be
lost in light of the nation's deteriorated economic condition. The ex-
planation for the Democrats' relative lack of success: "the abundance
of Republican money and campaign services." '226
When the lesson of the 1982 election becomes generally under-
stood, party recruitment will become steadily more important. Attrac-
tive candidates will be more readiy persuaded that their prospects are
good, despite adverse national political or economic conditions, if their
national party organization can provide substantial funding and sup-
port services. As a result, party success in recruiting strong candidates
will also improve.
All of this has important consequences for voters and for govern-
ment. It means voters will have a choice of more visible and more
capable candidates even under conditions which formerly tended to
produce weak challengers. Voters will be better able to control public
officials and public policy because they can more readily exercise
choices at the polls. Under continually competitive conditions, incum-
223. See Jacobson & Kemell, Strategy and Choice in the 1982 Congressional Elections, 15
PS 423-30 (1982).
224. Id at 427.
225. Id at 429-30.
226. See Sabato, supra note 121, at 80.
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bents will presumably pay closer attention to constituent interests and
preferences as they make public policy. A final possibility is that par-
ties will assume greater influence in the governmental process because
their support for challengers will often be essential both to recruiting
candidates and to assuring the viability of their campaigns. This poten-
tial party role in governance, however, is subject to substantial discount
by external conditions which tend to confine party discretion in recruit-
ing and financing candidates.227
The Republican party's recruitment efforts are complex. In 1978,
for example, the Republican National Committee contributed $530,000
to GOP gubernatorial candidates and spent $1.7 million to aid the
party's state legislative candidates.228 One major purpose of these ex-
penditures was to elect Republican officeholders who could protect the
party's interest in the reapportionment of legislative and congressional
districts that would occur after the 1980 election; another purpose was
to "restock the primary recruitment pools for congressional candidates"
by placing possible contenders in state legislative seats where they
could gain experience and visibility.229 National party expenditures to
aid state and local candidates continued in 1980 and 1982.230
The Republican party has also made significant contributions to
congressional candidates.23 ' Republican general election candidates
for the United States Senate in 1980 spent $35 million in their nomina-
tion and election campaigns, including party contributions of
$677,000.232 Party committees made additional coordinated expendi-
tures of $5.4 million on their behalf.233 Party outlays thus accounted for
15.1 percent of the funds spent directly by or on behalf of Republican
Senate candidates. In races for the House of Representatives, Republi-
can general election candidates spent $58.6 million, including $3.5 mil-
lion in contributions from party committees.234 These committees
spent an additional $2.2 million in coordinated expenditures. Total
227. See infra notes 263-85, 297-305, 320-24 and accompanying text.
228. Bibby, Political Parties andFederalism: The Republican National Committee Involve-
ment in Gubernatorial andLegislative Elections, 9 PUBLIUS 229, 231, 235 (1979). Party efforts
to win control of state legislatures continued in 1980. See Buchanan, National GOP Pushing
Hard To Capture State Legislatures, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3188-92 (1980).
229. Mann & Ornstein, 2he Republican Surge in Congress, in THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS
OF 1980, at 263, 264-66 (A. Ranney ed. 1981).
230. Adamany, supra note 182, at 100.
231. See Sabato, supra note 121, at 74-75.
232. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final Statistics on 1979-80 Congressional
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party outlays therefore constituted $5.7 million, or 9.4 percent, of total
disbursements of $60.8 million.235
This party role in total expenditures appears modest on the sur-
face, but its importance should not be understated. The Republicans
concentrated their funds in those districts in which their candidates for
the House of Representatives appeared to have strong prospects for
success. Generally they were able to make the maximum contributions
and coordinated expenditures permitted by law in those races. 236 They
were also able to give the maximum financial support permitted by law
in all Senate races where GOP candidates had reasonable electoral
prospects.237
Republican party committees were able to provide this financial
support to their candidates almost immediately after they were nomi-
nated because they had raised money steadily during the interelection
period. The impact of this assured early money can scarcely be over-
stated. It allowed candidates to develop early campaign momentum,
which attracted additional funds and other political resources. These
guaranteed early funds surpass all other recruitment incentives to
candidates.
The pattern of Republican financial assistance to candidates con-
tinued in 1982. Republican general election candidates and party orga-
nizations spent $62.5 million in Senate races;23 party contributions
were $600,000 and party coordinated expenditures were $8.7 million," 9
for a party effort totaling 14.9 percent of all outlays. In House races,
Republican general election candidates and party committees spent $92
million.240 Contributions of $5.3 million and coordinated expenditures
of $4.6 million accounted for 10.8 percent of campaign spending.
241
The Democrats have not developed a strong financial base like
that of the Republican national party. This has diminished the Demo-
cratic opportunity to use campaign funds as a recruitment tool. In
1979-80, for example, net candidate disbursements and party coordi-
nated expenditures for Democratic general election candidates for the
Senate totaled $41 million.242 Total party contributions and coordi-
235. Id.
236. Sabato, supra note 121, at 74-75.
237. Id.
238. See Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Data on 1981-82 Congressional Spending,
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nated expenditures were only $1.6 million, or 3.9 percent.243 Similarly,
candidate disbursements and coordinated expenditures for Democratic
general election House candidates totaled $57.5 million, while party
contributions and coordinated expenditures were $1.3 million or 2.3
percent. 2 " This low level of party support, even if targeted in key dis-
tricts, was insufficient to have a significant impact on recruiting
candidates.
In 1980 the Democrats had so many congressional incumbents
that candidate recruiting may have been a low priority for party com-
mittees. In 1982, however, the Democrats had strong reasons to recruit
aggressive officeseekers, but the party's finances still did not permit
substantial support for candidates. In 1982 Democratic general elec-
tion candidates for the Senate spent $44.5 million and were supported
by $1.5 million in coordinated expenditures.245 Yet party contributions
of $600,000 and coordinated expenditures of $2.3 million accounted for
only 4.6 percent ($2.9 million) of the candidates' financial efforts.246
The Democratic party role in House campaigns was even smaller. Ex-
penditures of $88.3 million and party coordinated outlays of $700,000
constituted a total campaign effort of $89 million.247 The party's contri-
butions of $1 million and coordinated expenditures of $700,000 made
up only 1.9 percent ($1.7 million) of that total campaign effort. Plainly,
Democratic party committees have a very long way to go before they
play a significant role in candidate recruitment.
Republican candidates are undoubtedly influenced to run by the
array of special campaign services their party offers. Republican candi-
dates receive valuable research materials on most political issues. Re-
gional party staffers assist GOP candidates in organizing and
conducting campaigns." In both 1980 and 1982 the Republicans con-
ducted a special Campaign Management College for House and Senate
campaign managers and senior staff;24 9 this program focused on sophis-
ticated technologies and fundraising activities, as well as on conven-
tional campaign practices. The national Republican party committees
have developed a data bank of voting patterns and demographic char-
acteristics of districts throughout the country. This information has
proved useful to candidates as well as Republican party units in target-
243. Id
244. Id
245. FEC Releases Final Report on 1981-82 Congressional Elections, supra note 238.
246. Id
247. Id
248. Adamany, supra note 182, at 79, 99.
249. Id at 80.
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ing areas for registration efforts, get-out-the-vote drives, and
canvassing.25o
Most impressive has been the development of GOP polling and
media materials for candidates. In 1980, the national Republican party
maintained a professional staff to train candidates to conduct reliable
polls inexpensively.251 By 1982 the party had developed more sophisti-
cated tracking polls. 252 These polls showed trends in public opinion
and allowed candidates successfully to make continuing adjustments in
campaign strategy.
In 1980 the Republican party assisted its candidates by providing
scriptwriting, filming, and editing for campaign commercials. 253 In
1982, this program evolved into full scale development of campaign
commercials and buying broadcast time, which saved candidates con-
siderable sums. Larry Sabato has reported that the Republican Na-
tional Committee gave ninety-two GOP candidates 180 television
advertisements and other media services in 1982.254 This was a dra-
matic increase from the eight candidates assisted in 1978 and about
fifty helped in 1980.255 The Republican program of institutional adver-
tising in 1980 and 1982 was also of assistance and thus aided Republi-
can efforts to recruit candidates.
The Democrats provided a much slimmer package of campaign
assistance in both 1980 and 1982, partly because they lacked sufficient
financing. In former years, some services were also less important to
the Democrats since they mainly fielded incumbents. Many Demo-
cratic incumbents, long in office and recently without serious competi-
tion, lost touch with the emerging campaign technology and were
simply unprepared to wage modem political campaigns. In 1980, the
Democrats ran four or five training sessions for congressional candi-
dates, and these sessions apparently were far less sophisticated than the
Republican campaign schools, but their Democratic efforts to advise
candidates how to meet New Right attacks on the social issues were
successful.25 6 There was no apparent effort by Democratic party
groups to assist candidates with activities such as polling and media
spots.
250. Id at 81, 99-100.
251. Id at 81; Sabato, supra note 121, at 76-78; Roberts, supra note 217.
252. Sabato, supra note 121, at 76-78.
253. Adamany, supra note 182, at 81.
254. Sabato, supra note 121, at 77.
255. Id
256. Adamany, supra note 182, at 89-90.
In 1982, the Democrats attempted to provide greater assistance to
candidates. Issue papers were prepared and circulated. "National
training academies" were held for candidates and party operatives.257
The Democratic Party apparently enlisted labor unions to help with
polling and precinct targeting, although neither the unions nor party
committees made these efforts on a scale comparable to the Republican
program.258 The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
waged a campaign to send critical press releases into the districts of
Republican congressmen,259 presumably to weaken them to attack
from Democratic challengers. The DNC hired a well-known political
consultant to strengthen Democratic party organization activities in
eighteen states.260 Voter registration, identification, and turnout were
especially emphasized. 26' Although much more vigorous than in 1980,
Democratic efforts in 1982 were still limited by a lack of sophistication
and a thin purse.262 They did not come close to matching the Republi-
cans' support for candidates, and Democratic support activities pre-
sumably were not attractive enough to assist significantly in candidate
recruitment.
Aggregating and Representing Interests. It was once possible to de-
scribe the political parties in terms of the regional and socio-economic
blocs which voted for them.263 The South was the "Solid Democratic
South," while the Rocky Mountain states were stoutly Republican.
Union workers and other blue collar occupations were Democrats,
while business and professional people were consistently Republican.
Catholics and Jews were part of the Democratic coalition, while Protes-
tants (except blacks) were mainly Republicans. After the New Deal,
blacks and other racial minorities were Democratic. The nationality
groups that most recently immigrated to the United States were Demo-
crats; old settlers and their more recently arrived kin were Republicans.
To some extent these lines continue to divide persons who identify
with the two parties.2" Moreover, there have been modem attempts to
re-enforce regional and socio-economic bloc voting. The Republicans
have had a "Southern Strategy." The Democrats have insisted on spe-
257. Sabato, supra note 121, at 84.
258. Id at 88-89.
259. Id at 84.
260. Id
261. Id
262. Roberts, supra note 217; Peterson, Republicans May Show Jkhat Money Can Do in
November Races, Wash. Post, May 30, 1982, at A2, col. 1.
263. See C. RossIrER, supra note 14, at ch. 6.
264. F. SORAUF, supra note 3, at 147.
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cial representation for unionists, blacks, women, and the young in party
conventions; and their platforms have been particularly overt in woo-
ing such diverse groups as women, blacks, Hispanics, and gay men and
lesbians. In fact, women have shown somewhat greater affinity for the
Democrats than in the past, and blacks seem to remain consistently
Democratic in outlook.265
Generally, however, traditional voting lines are blurring. Many
voters have declared themselves independent and an unexpected
number of others have deviated from traditional party banners to claim
opposition party affiliation.266 Moreover, the traditional lines have not
held up at the ballot box. There appears to be a nationalization of
American politics: in each successive election, voting groups look more
and more alike. In each election some groups abandon traditional pat-
terns by voting predominantly for the other party's candidate.267 There
is strong evidence that voters increasingly are dividing along issue and
ideological lines rather than by traditional groupings.
-8
The effectiveness of parties in aggregating interests has had two
aspects. First, each party brought together the groups that predomi-
nantly supported its candidates and sought to meld them into a coali-
tion in which all would share in governmental policymaking and
appointments. Second, each party was mindful that it was supported
by at least a significant minority among blocs principally affiliated with
the opposition; each party therefore sought to broaden its coalition to
make room for these minority blocs. The aggregation of interests was a
device of electoral strategy; but its effects were to have all groups repre-
sented in each party, and to mute differences between parties in the
course of making national policy.269 With the erosion of bloc lines,
there has been less reason to mobilize and aggregate the traditional
groups. In addition, with the rise of ideological and issue voting, it has
become increasingly difficult to build coalitions, since issues and ideol-
ogy tend to clarify differences and to divide voters along clearer dimen-
sions. The campaign finance laws have had little to do with the decline
of traditional blocs in the American electorate or with the increase of
issue orientation by voters in elections.
265. Bonafede, Women's Movement Broadens the Scope of Its Role in American Politics,
14 NAT'L J. 2108-11 (1982); Will, Black Voting.Bloc Trouble for GOP, Detroit News, Mar.
25, 1983, at 9A, col. 1.
266. N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 33, at ch. 13.
267. On traditional voting bloc defections in 1980, see Clymer, Displeasure with Carter
Turned Many to Reagan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, at A28, col. 3.
268. See N. NIE, S. VERBA & 3. PETROCIK, supra note 33, at chs. 11, 12, 18.
269. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 54-60.
There is, however, another reason for the atrophy of party coali-
tion-building activities that is related to campaign finance laws. As
party organizations lost control of nominations and of vote-mobilizing
activities, they have not been able to "deliver" governmental policies.
As a result, organized interest groups--such as business, labor, reli-
gious organizations, veterans, and others manifesting underlying socio-
economic divisions in society-have not found it necessary or useful to
work closely with party organizations. These organized groups have
sought directly to influence the electoral process by contributing to can-
didates rather than parties and by campaigning for or against candi-
dates. In these respects, campaign finance laws have promoted direct
political activity by groups at the expense of the traditional party role
of aggregating interests and groups.
The FECA's authorization for associations and corporations to
spend their treasury money to organize PACs has plainly had the effect
of heightening direct, interest group politics. It would be a mistake to
believe, however, that there was no interest group money in politics
before the enactment of the FECA. Long before the FECA, labor un-
ions collected "voluntary" funds from members and made contribu-
tions to candidates and parties; 270 and unions waged vigorous efforts to
register union voters, persuade them, and get them to the polls.
2 71
Business interests also made political contributions to candidates and
parties. A small part of their effort was through traditional trade or
professional associations that collected voluntary contributions from
members.272 The most important flow of business money was chan-
neled by well connected solicitors directly from corporate officers and
directors to candidates or party organizations. 3 Year after year it was
possible to detect substantial contributors who were directors or officers
of major defense contractors, Fortune 500 industrial firms, the Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute, and similar entities.2 74
In one respect, the FECA has curbed the old system of direct inter-
est group influence. The contribution limits cap the amount that a
union or a corporate official can give to a candidate, and put a ceiling
on the total amount an individual can give to all candidates. Despite
these limitations, there is little doubt that, on balance, the FECA has
270. A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 185-87 (1960); H. ALEXANDER, supra note
165, at 170-72.
271. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 165, at 173-75.
272. Id at 175-76.
273. G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TRE? 165-205 (1973).
274. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 165, at 153-57; H. ALEXANDER, supra note 167, at
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promoted direct interest group activity. The FECA allows unions and
corporations to use substantial sums of treasury money to solicit contri-
butions. The result has been a massive increase in the number of dol-
lars raised, especially by corporations. Moreover, the new corporate
PACs raise most of their funds by small contributions from large num-
bers of employees.2 75 This tends to diminish the influence of the con-
tributors and strengthen the influence of corporate officers on how
political funds should be spent and to whom such money should be
contributed.
The contribution limits on PACs have not been effective in reduc-
ing the direct influence of interest groups. The typical pattern276 is for
a large number of separate union PACs or PACs from the same sector
of the business community to contribute to the $5,000 maximum to
candidates. In the aggregate these $5,000 gifts become massive
amounts.
The vast increase in direct interest group activity under the FECA
can be readily illustrated. The total number of PACs registered with
the FEC rose from 608 in 1974 to 3,371 at the end of 1982.277 The total
financial activity of PACs was not well documented before 1976, but in
that year their total adjusted receipts were $54.4 million. 78 In 1980
PAC receipts had risen to $137.7 million,279 and in 1982 total receipts
were $199.5 million. 8 0 The PACs have nearly achieved parity with
political parties in fundraising ability. Total local, state, and national
party receipts reported to the FEC were $196.2 million in 1980 and
$253.9 million in 1982.81
In making contributions, PACs have greatly outdistanced the
political parties. In 1980, PACs contributed $60.2 million to candi-
dates, and made independent expenditures of another $14.2 million to
support or oppose candidates.282 By contrast, party committees con-
tributed $6.2 million to candidates and spent $17.4 million in coordi-
275. Adamany, supra note 92, at 590.
276. See Sabato, supra note 121, at 89-96.
277. Fed. Election Comm'n, PACs Increase in Number, Press Release 1 (Jan. 14, 1983).
278. Epstein, Business and Labor Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, in
PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 117 (M. Malbin ed. 1980).
279. FEC Releases Final PAC Reportfor 1979-80 Election Cycle, Fed. Election Comm'n
Press Release (Feb. 21, 1982).
280. Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 PAC Study, Press Release 1
(Nov. 29, 1983).
281. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141, at 3; FEC Final Reportfor 1981-82
Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats, supra note 169, at 2.
282. FEC Releases Final PAC Report, supra note 279.
nated expenditures on behalf of candidates.2 3  In 1982, PAC
contributions rose to $87.6 million and their independent expenditures
were $5.7 million. 84 Party committees contributed $6.9 million and
made coordinated expenditures of $16.9 million.2 85 Hence, PACs out-
distanced parties by a margin of more than three to one in direct candi-
date support in 1980 and almost four to one in 1982. Although the
parties offered an array of services, institutional advertising, and other
forms of assistance, the value of these services undoubtedly would not
equalize the levels of support candidates received from the two sources.
The FECA also authorizes PACs to engage in some types of
campaigning that duplicate the canvasses traditionally conducted by
political parties. The law specifically excludes from the definition of
"expenditures," which may be subject to limitation under the FECA,
spending for "nonpartisan activities designed to encourage individuals
to vote or to register to vote. '28 6 It is not difficult for unions or corpo-
rations to determine which groups or their members, employees, or
stockholders are most likely to vote for candidates favored by the union
or corporate leadership. Thus, nonpartisan registration and get-out-
the-vote drives are often candidate or party oriented, following the
preferences of the union or corporation.
The law also permits organizations, including unions and corpora-
tions, to communicate, using treasury funds, to members, stockholders,
or executive and administrative personnel about political issues and
candidates.287 Unions have long engaged in both voter mobilization
and voter persuasion activities; but with the availability of treasury
funds, labor engaged in greater election efforts in 1982 than at any time
since 1976.288 More than three million members of union households
were registered to vote; an estimated 150,000 labor volunteers and sev-
eral thousand staff members canvassed union neighborhoods and con-
ducted registration and get-out-the-vote drives.2 89 Mass mail appeals
were added to the longstanding union technique of using phone banks
283. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141.
284. FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 FAC Study, supra note 280, at 2.
285. FEC Final Reportfor 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats, supra note
169, at 2.
286. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ii) (1976).
287. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (1976).
288. See, e.g., Sabato, supra note 121, at 88-89. On labor's role in politics generally,
including union campaign efforts, see Keller, Organized Labor's Vital Signs Show Waning
Political Clout; But Numbers Don't Tell .411, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2111-18 (1982);
Keller, Once a Washington Power, Labor Now Plays Catch-up in Lobbying and Politics, 40
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2189-95 (1982).
289. Sabato, supra note 121, at 88.
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to contact union members.
290
There is little information on direct corporate appeals to stock-
holders or employees on behalf of particular candidates. It is inevita-
ble that as companies become more familiar with the campaign laws,
they will expand their political action activities beyond making cam-
paign contributions. The Realtors' PAC may serve as a model for
campaigning by business groups: in 1982 it used phone campaigning
and direct mail appeals on behalf of endorsed candidates.29'
The Supreme Court has held that no limit can be imposed on in-
dependent expenditures to support or oppose candidates.292 This has
allowed PACs to mount substantial media campaigns that overlap with
the FECA's special authorization for parties to make coordinated ex-
penditures. In 1980, conservative PACs dominated the independent
expenditure effort, spending their money primarily to oppose Demo-
cratic candidates for Congress.293  The dominance of conservative
PACs increased in 1982, but a variety of liberal PACs struck back,
often defending Democratic incumbents by making the expenditures of
conservative PACs an issue.
294
It can be argued that the political parties aggregated interest group
campaigning by channeling and directing PAC contributions. There is
some evidence to support such a contention. In 1980, for example, the
RNC and NRSC assigned staff members to work full time with PACs.
These staff members shared information with PACs and urged them to
funnel contributions to Republican candidates, especially challengers,
who appeared to have high prospects of winning.295 In 1982, both
Republicans and Democrats expanded their efforts to coordinate PAC
contributions.
296
The parties, however, have strong competitors for the role of di-
recting PAC money and endorsements.297 Both the liberal National
Committee for an Effective Congress and the conservative Committee
for the Survival of a Free Congress provide lists of candidates they
favor in closely contested races.298 More influential are the efforts of
290. Id
291. Id at 96.
292. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54-59 (1974).
293. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
294. See Sabato, supra note 121, at 102-03.
295. See Adamany, supra note 182, at 103.
296. Sabato, supra note 121, at 96-98.
297. Roberts, Helping PACs Decide How to Spend Their Money, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1982, at AS, col. 3; Eaton, Critics Fear PAC Money Unduly Sways Congress, L.A. Times,
Dec. 20, 1982, at § 1, p. 1, col. 1.
298. Sabato, supra note 121, at 94.
the Business and Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC), which
has been providing lists of business-oriented candidates in competitive
races since the mid-1960's.299 In addition, BIPAC holds periodic brief-
ings for staff members of PACs with similar interests to provide infor-
mation about key races." In 1982, the Chamber of Commerce made
extraordinary efforts to influence PAC support for candidates: it con-
ducted a closed-circuit, satellite-transmitted program for 250 PAC
managers in seven cities to urge their support for 100 business-oriented
candidates. 01 It is plausible that party influence in directing PAC sup-
port will wane further as the relatively new staffs of PACs gain more
sophistication, expand their own sources of information about candi-
dates and races, and become more confident in making political
judgments.
It may be that PACs will eventually align themselves with the two
parties along the traditional American political divide: labor and lib-
eral PACs would be affiliated with the Democrats; trade associations,
professional groups, corporate PACs, and conservative organizations
would be allied with the Republicans. This scenario does seem possi-
ble since many PACs have contributed predictably to candidates of the
parties for which they have had a traditional affinity. The important
exceptions have been trade association and corporate PACs, which
have tended to favor incumbents. In 1980, however, business-oriented
PACs showed a strong propensity to support Republican challengers
against Democratic incumbents-at least those Democratic incumbents
who appeared vulnerable.3 "2
Although it cannot be said that the parties aggregated the interests
embodied in the PACs or even represented those PACs, there might
nonetheless be constellations of PACs and parties. Parties would likely
be the central bodies in these arrays because of the affiliations of candi-
dates with parties and the broader range of activities ordinarily under-
taken by parties. This picture of a "new politics" of parties and PACs
has been aptly described by one of the nation's leading students of
parties:
Since major groups would probably be far more comfortable
with one major party than the other, they would in most in-
stances have no option but to support most of the party's candi-
dates in the general election or to remain silent. Such a degree of
commitment suggests that bargaining, the use of group leverage,
299. Id at 95.
300. Id
301. Roberts, supra note 297.
302. See E. Epstein, supra note 164; Sabato, supra note 121, at 90-91.
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would take place at the nomination step, especially in primary
election contests. Majority building thus would become more
complex and less efficient as the number of steps and the number
of participants in it increased. The picture, then, is one of a
group of intermediate electoral organizations [the PACs] cluster-
ing around each of the major parties and trying to mediate its
building of majorities. In electoral politics, at least, it is a picture
that suggests a shift in American practice to some point between
two-party and multi-party electoral politics.
30 3
Even this indirect aggregation and representation of interests is not
clearly in the political parties' stars. In 1982, the business-related PACs
apparently returned to their pre-1980 strategy of assisting incumbents,
largely without regard to party affiliation.3 4
Except for ideological independent committees and groups like
labor on the left and oil producers on the right, then, party affilia-
tion and philosophy were not the prime determinants of PAC
contributions in 1982. Rather, practical and strategic questions
were crucial indicators for most PACs. In deciding which incum-
bents to support, the typical trade or corporate PAC in 1982 ap-
pears to have asked a set of queries somewhat like these: (1) Is
the congressman on a key committee affecting our industry?;
(2) Do we have a plant in the district?; (3) Has the incumbent
voted "right" on issues affecting us?; (4) Has the incumbent been
accessible to us?; (5) Has he attempted to get to know our
problems and helped us to cut government red tape?
305
Applying these criteria, business-related PACs found many Democratic
incumbents worthy of financial support. Business-oriented PACs re-
verted in 1982 to a pattern of promoting short-term interests rather
than developing a coalition with other generally conservative commit-
tees and the GOP to effect a long-term alignment of PACs along tradi-
tional party lines. The parties, in turn, are unlikely to play central roles
in aggregating or representing interests as long as PACs do not drift
toward long-term alignments with parties.
Governance. It is important not to fall into the trap of blaming the
present disorganization of governmental policymaking on contempo-
rary conditions, including campaign finance laws. There may have
been a time, in the era of the city machines and courthouse rings, when
a party organization could discipline an officeholder who displeased
the party regulars. Those species of American party organizations were
held together largely by the incentives of patronage, preferments, and
303. Sorauf, supra note 72, at 463.
304. Cohen, supra note 132, at 2145.
305. Sabato, supra note 121, at 93.
privileges. An officeholder might be punished for not delivering the
expected material benefits, but only rarely could it be expected that he
would be jilted by the party organization for failing to follow a party
platform or a President who belonged to the same party.
30 6
The more remote the policymaking process from local machines
and material incentives, the less likely it was that local party organiza-
tions would exercise their authority to insist on adherence to party pro-
grams by their elected officeholders. As a result, even in the heyday of
party organizations, the American parties scarcely conformed to a
model of cohesive agencies of governance. As one commentator stated:
Parties in America fall well short of the ideal of democracy or
even of the reality of parties in many other countries. They are
especially ineffectual in the task of formulating policies and
transforming them into governmental programs, and thus they
get only low marks for their performance of the great, overriding
function of channeling and disciplining the struggle for power.
3°0
These words, written in 1960, predated both modem campaign
technology and contemporary election laws, including campaign fi-
nance regulations. Even in 1960, however, the failure of party govern-
ment was an old story. In 1942, the leading proponent of American
party government admitted:
[W]hen all is said, it remains true that the roll calls demonstrate
that the parties are unable to hold their lines on a controversial
public issue when the pressure is on. . .. This condition...
constitutes the most important single fact concerning the Ameri-
can parties. What kind of party is it that, having won control of
government, is unable to govern?
30 8
One can make the argument that modern conditions have further
weakened the ability of parties to mobilize public officials behind the
party's program. Modem campaign technology connects candidates
directly to voters, thus emphasizing candidate strategy. Moreover, the
prominence of PACs tends to pull candidates away from adherence to
a party program. During the campaign, candidates may trim sails in
order to gamer contributions. In office, they give preferred access to
the special interests who provided these contributions, and they weigh
their need to return to the PACs for money as they deliberate on issues.
306. See Sundquist, supra note 59, at 47.
307. C. RoSSITER, supra note 14, at 51.
308. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 131-32.
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The beginning of the Ninety-eighth Congress was marked by a
news story noting that:
More and more members of Congress are openly expressing their
fears of a political financing system that excites the strong suspi-
cion-and possibly the reality-that the special interests that or-
ganize PACs get favored treatment from the legislators whose
campaigns they underwrite." 9
Senator Robert Dole put it more bluntly: "When these political action
committees give money, they expect something in return other than
good government.1
310
Oddly, the parties are now showing somewhat greater vitality than
they have during most of the modem era. Roll call voting along party
lines remains reasonably strong.31 There is also an ideological cast to
the parties that was previously lacking. 3'2 Furthermore, voters are now
more ideologically consistent in their views and tend to vote for candi-
dates who share their views.
31 3
It is unlikely that the campaign finance laws are significantly re-
lated either to the weakness of party government or to the perceived
revival of party cohesion along ideological lines. It may be that party
weakness has been fueled by the availability of PAC contributions,
which allows candidates to make mass media appeals directly to voters
without reliance on party support, and causes officeholders to make
policy decisions with little regard to party positions. But money was
already available from non-party sources prior to the enactment of the
FECA. Parties have never played major roles in financing
candidates.
31 4
Equally implausible is the assertion that the revitalization of party
finance, particularly in the national Republican party, is causing new
ideological cohesion within the parties. 315 It is true that the Republican
party demonstrated unusual discipline in supporting President Rea-
gan's program during his first year of office.316 Toward the end of the
President's first congressional session, however, that unity had already
309. Taylor, supra note 4, at A5, col. 1. See generally E. DREw, supra note 114, at 67-76.
310. Taylor, supra note 4, at A5, col. 1.
311. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; Sundquist, supra note 59, at 57-58.
313. See N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 33, at chs. 12, 13, 18; G. POMPER,
supra note 47, at 166-85; Wattenberg, supra note 46.
314. See Adamany, supra note 89, and sources cited therein on patterns of party financial
support for candidates.
315. See Sundquist, supra note 59, at 52.
316. Id. at 45.
begun to weaken.31 7 The early stages of the Ninety-eighth Congress
indicate that the Republican members of Congress will assume a larger
measure of independence than they did two years earlier.
A crucial question is whether the Republicans can use their sub-
stantial financial resources to instill party discipline. The Republican
party played an important role in recruiting candidates in 1982; it fol-
lows that it would seek out or support those who adhered to the party
line. Indeed, the Republican National Committee did become in-
volved in a few primaries.318 Nevertheless, it has been reported that
"decision making was not based upon the policy positions of the candi-
dates; as in the grand old days, estimates of electability dominated the
party choice. According to the RNC's counsel, . . . neither ideology
nor issues entered into decisions of which candidates should receive the
maximum support. 319
There is some evidence that the Republican party leadership at-
tempted to influence the behavior of Republican members of Congress
by directly or indirectly suggesting that campaign funds would be with-
held if they did not support the President's program.3 20 But there is no
evidence that such tactics were widespread or that they were successful.
Noting that Republican candidates now receive substantial financial
contributions and technical assistance from the national party organi-
zation, one commentator has astutely reasoned that:
[o]nce a new member takes his seat, whether money proves to be
an instrument of continuing discipline will depend on the will-
ingness of party leaders to withhold funds in future campaigns
from members who defy the leadership. If past experience is a
guide, it can be assumed that such penalties would be imposed
only on the rarest of occasions, and the Republicans therefore,
despite their greater resources, will encounter much the same de-
gree of difficulty the Democrats have always faced in molding a
cohesive majority party out of an assemblage of individualists. 
32'
A quite different use of party money would be to stimulate grass-
roots support for the party position during the congressional session.
In 1981, the Republican National Committee used its substantial finan-
cial resources to wage a campaign to mobilize support for President
317. Plattner, Congress in 1982: Stirrings of Independence, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
3143 (1982).
318. See Arterton, supra note 161, at 130; Roberts, supra note 186.
319. Arterton, supra note 161, at 129.
320. See, e.g., Evans & Novak, Nixon Style Noted in Tax BilF ight, Detroit News, Aug.
16, 1982, at All, col. 1.
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Reagan's tax and budget packages.3 22 Both individuals and organized
groups were urged by the Republican national party to communicate
their views to legislators. The Republican organization's greatest effort
was aimed at stirring up grassroots pressure on Democratic members of
Congress. This strategy is readily understood: Republican party pres-
sure on its own officeholders might well jeopardize their re-election
prospects by splitting the party's support base in their districts, and re-
placement of a Republican Congressman with a Democrat would be
worse than occasional defections by the party's own members from that
district.
The Republican party's effort was not as organized or successful as
party leaders had hoped; however, this might be attributed to hurried
planning and implementation, as well as the unfamiliarity of using
such campaigning as a party device. One commentator has argued that
"the use of party machinery and finances to mobilize citizen opinion
has provocative potential. Carried to an extreme, party committees
might use this citizen link to pressure officeholders into greater party
discipline.1323 He then characterized this activity as resembling "more
the functioning of a political action committee than. . . a revitalized
and nationalized version of traditional parties.1324 It may be that the
party has become simply another interest group bringing pressure on
officeholders, rather than an instrument for mobilizing elected officials
to support a coherent program and policy. This falls far short of the
governance function generally visualized for political parties.
One must conclude that the American parties, even at their zenith,
were only weak instruments of policymaking. The decline of tradi-
tional party organizations, in response to social and demographic
changes as well as the new campaign technology, eroded the already
modest governance functions of parties. The FECA contributed to the
decline of party government by authorizing PACs, which could supply
substantial funds to candidates to use the new campaign technology.
The FECA did not cause any major changes, however, since candidates
had already been raising money to wage new style campaigns even
before the PACs emerged so mightily from its provisions.
Ironically, there is an increasing level of party cohesion in Con-
gress. But this is due to changes in technology, the ideological and is-
sue orientation of voters, and the tendency of candidates to appeal to
these changing constituencies. Increased funding may have allowed
322. Arterton, supra note 161, at 130-31.
323. Id at 131.
324. Id
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candidates to wage such campaigns, but did not cause them to do so.
In sum, campaign finance laws have had little impact on party cohesion
in government.
V. Political Finance and Institutional Balances
One of the common complaints about the new campaign finance
regulations is that they have distorted carefully balanced institutional
relationships throughout the American political system.325 There is no
doubt that traditional institutional balances appear to be shifting. It is
not clear, however, that campaign finance laws are the principal causes
of these shifts, although they plainly contribute to some of them.
One concern is the centralization of political campaigns. In presi-
dential races, the public subsidy flows to candidates. This greatly in-
creases the control of the central campaign staff over political activities.
The candidate's staff husbands resources to assure their availability for
approved campaign activities, such as mass media advertising or direct
mailing. The candidate is held strictly accountable for following the
FECA's complex restrictions on the use of public money, its limits on
contributions and expenditures, and its disclosure requirements. This
requires careful operation of the campaign treasury.326
The centralization of campaigns has been said to separate parties
from candidates.3 27 The parties are limited in their expenditures on
behalf of candidates in both congressional and presidential races.
Moreover, the required separation of funds in federal office campaigns
from the funds used for local and state candidates has tended to drive
state and local parties out of federal campaign activities.
32
There is little doubt that the disclosure requirements of the FECA
and the flow of public subsidies to candidates have produced some cen-
tralization in campaigns. It should be remembered, however, that the
national parties were not historically separate from the presidential
campaigns. It was traditional for a party's presidential nominee to ap-
point one of his operatives as national party chairman, and for the na-
325. See, e.g., Adamany, Political Finance in Transition, 14 POLITY 314, 328-31 (1981).
326. See Cheney, The Lawv's Impact on Presidential and Congressional Election Cam-
paign, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 238, 239-40 (M. Mal-
bin ed. 1980); Keefe, Presidential Campaign Strategy Under the Law, in PARTIES, INTEREST
GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 233-37 (M. Malbin ed. 1980).
327. See, e.g., Kayden, Campaign Finance: The Impact on Parties and PACs, in AN
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AT, 1972-78, at 4.20-.23
(1979).
328. Kayden, The Nationalizing of the Party System, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 257, 264-65 (M. Malbin ed. 1980).
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tional committee to operate simply as an arm of the presidential
campaign.329 Thus, the presidential campaigns were already firmly
centralized at the national level.
By contrast, the centralization of congressional campaigns and the
separation of state and local parties from federal office campaigns tend
to concentrate political decisionmaking in fewer hands. Recent
changes in the FECA have greatly eased this centralized campaigning,
except in the area of financial reporting. The judicially created right to
engage in independent expenditures and PACs' statutory authority to
campaign among members, employees, or shareholders have decentral-
ized campaign activity. The 1979 amendments to the FECA authoriz-
ing local party organizations to engage in grassroots voter mobilization
and campaigning have further reduced the tendency to centralize
campaigning in the candidate's headquarters.
Nevertheless, congressional campaigns will likely remain central-
ized. One of the most important causes of centralization is not the
FECA, but the changing style of politics: with the decline in effective
precinct organizations and the emergence of media and mass mail
campaigning, candidates naturally concentrate resources in their per-
sonal campaign committees in order to engage in these expensive cam-
paign activities.
A second concern is the presumed nationalization of political par-
ties.330 In. the Democratic party this nationalization has occurred
largely in national party rulemaking.331 Nationalization in the Repub-
lican party has been spurred by party finances.
Republican national party committees raised $130.3 million in
1980332 and $191 million in 1982. 333 State and local Republican orga-
nizations reporting to the FEC had net revenues of $33.8 million in
1980334 and $239 million in 1982.335 The highly successful mass mail
fundraising by the national Republican committees largely accounts
for this disparity. These fundraising techniques are the progeny of
329. Ranney, supra note 2, at 236-37.
330. See, e.g., Huckshorn & Bibby, State Parties in an Era of Chance, in THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIEs: THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE 70, 80-84 (J. Fleishman
ed. 1982); Kayden, supra note 328, at 263-64.
331. See Huckshorn & Bibby, supra note 330, at 80-82.
332. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141 (figures exclude public subsidies to par-
ties for party convention expenses).
333. FEC Final Reportfor 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats, supra note
169, at 2.
334. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141, at 3.
335. FEC Final Reportfor 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats, supra note
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modem technology rather than of the FECA; they would have been
possible if the FECA had never been enacted. Party nationalization
has been heightened by the manner in which the Republican national
party committees have spent their funds: support of local and state can-
didates, as well as federal office aspirants; party-oriented institutional
advertising; technical services to candidates; grassroots campaigning;
and creation of a regional staff network.
The Democratic national party committees raised $23.1 million in
1980336 and $31.4 million in 1982. 337 Their local brethren registered
receipts of $9.1 million in 1980338 and $7.6 million in 1982.339 Al-
though the national party gained financial strength, its resources did
not give rise to a nationalization of party activity. Moreover, it pos-
sessed neither the strategy nor the skills to provide the party-oriented
services and activities that characterized the Republican national party,
although the Democrats did make fledgling efforts of this kind in 1982.
Despite some evidence of party nationalization, there is also evi-
dence of vitality in the local and state parties. State parties generally
maintain a professional staff and a headquarters, have a reasonable
funding base, and engage in campaign activities.?" Local parties oper-
ate modestly during interelection periods and engage in a wide array of
campaign activities.34'
Republican party finance has been strengthened in some states by
the use of mass mail appeals, often with the encouragement or direct
assistance of the Republican National Committee.342 Both parties have
benefitted from state public subsidy schemes. In eight of the twelve
states with public subsidy plans, the funds run entirely or partly to state
or local party committees.343 In 1980, public subsidies to parties in
these eight states totalled $1.5 million.3" This amount is likely to in-
crease as public subsidy plans become better established and as the par-
336. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141, at 3.
337. FEC Final Report/or 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats, supra note
169, at 2.
338. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141, at 3.
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ties see an advantage in promoting taxpayer participation in election
financing. Although $1.5 million in subsidies is quite modest in the
context of national party expenditures, it is a commitment to the vital-
ity of state parties and permits the parties a somewhat stable funding
base for organizational and campaign activities.
A number of studies have shown that each segment within the par-
ties performs different political functions.345 Candidates generally
spend their funds on media advertising, campaign literature, and simi-
lar direct promotional activities. State parties use their money for staff,
candidate support, and organizational stimulation and maintenance.
Local organizations generally make candidate contributions and spend
funds on mailings to voters, posters and signs, brochures, headquarters
and telephone banks. It can be argued that the shift of funds to candi-
dates and national parties and away from local parties will cause some
specialized functions to be performed at the expense of others. This
contention lacks force in the present day because many of the organiza-
tional activities conducted by state and local parties have atrophied for
reasons unrelated to funding, and the effectiveness of those activities
has been minimized by the advent of more effective campaign technol-
ogies. Hence, even if contemporary shifts in the locus of political activ-
ity toward candidates and national parties are actually occurring, it is
unlikely that the erosion of the traditional specialized functions of par-
ties is due to changes in political finance laws.
A third concern is the rising level of bureaucracy in political struc-
tures.346 The complexity of the FECA has caused parties and candi-
dates to hire accountants and attorneys to assure compliance with legal
requirements and limitations. More important than these compliance
bureaucrats, however, are the staffs devoted to fundraising and political
activity. A permanent technical and professional staff is necessary to
operate a continuously growing mass mail fundraising program. In ad-
dition, the new political services offered by parties-technical services
to candidates, training programs for party workers and campaign man-
agers, field operations to support party and candidate organizations,
polling and media development activities-require permanent, profes-
sional party bureaucrats. In any case, volunteer party activity has been
weakened by the passing of old style political organizations, the decline
of neighborhoods, the transience of voters, and other factors that have
345. See, e.g., D. ADAMANY, supra note 12, at 26-55; A. HEARD, supra note 270, at 304-
11,395.
346. See Kayden, supra note 327, at 4.14-.15.
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eroded traditional party structures.
347
In 1982 the Republican National Committee employed 350 staff
members, the National Republican Congressional Committee 84 em-
ployees, and the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee 40 staff-
ers.348 The counterpart Democratic committees had a total of 141
employees.3 49 The Republican party staffs were generally well paid,
enjoyed continuing employment, and performed specialized tasks in a
business-like operating structure.3 50 There was high turnover on Dem-
ocratic party staffs, working conditions were much more pressured and
chaotic, and there was less emphasis on specialization and technical
skill in Democratic offices.
351
The evidence is persuasive that the FECA, together with the revi-
talization of party finances, has promoted party bureaucracy, especially
in the Republican party. Modern technology has become the critical
factor in modern campaigning, fundraising, and other political activi-
ties. Such technology, which requires modern fundraising as its fuel,
has weakened traditional party organizations by requiring professional
staffs for the new party operations. Neither political finance laws nor
modern financing practices are the sole cause of the bureaucratization
of parties; but they are substantial contributors to the new pattern of
party staffing that is significantly responsible for that trend.
352
A fourth concern is the shift of influence from the legislative to the
executive branch of government. It has been suggested that campaign
finance laws accelerate this shift:
Publicly financed presidential campaigns would gradually raise
public esteem for the executive because of its freedom from pri-
vate money entanglements, while diminishing respect for a legis-
lature still reliant on private and special interest sources.
Similarly, generous public financing of presidential campaigns
will gradually raise the visibility of the executive, increasing pub-
lic reliance on and confidence in the president for policy
leadership.
353
At least one commentary has intimated that this condition has come to
pass. Unable to contribute to the 1976 presidential campaign, "special
interests poured their funds into congressional coffers, creating in effect
a dual electoral system-a 'clean' presidential campaign and a 'dirty'
347. See supra part III B.
348. Schram, GOP Meets Realiy-on the Button, Wash. Post, May 16, 1982, at A4, col. 3.
349. Id
350. Adamany, supra note 182, at 108-09.
351. Id
352. See supra part III B.
353. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 203, at 176.
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congressional one. This was claimed to have harmed Congress' image
and integrity while improving the image of the presidency." 35 4 There
can be little doubt that the flow of PAC money and influence now
hangs like a dark cloud over the Congress.
355
This shift of influence might be heightened by the establishment of
"presidential PACs." For example, Citizens for the Republic was es-
tablished in 1977 as the successor to Citizens for Reagan. 56 Its pur-
pose was to support conservative Republican candidates. By
strengthening the conservative wing of the Republican party, Citizens
for the Republic also helped promote the fortunes of Ronald Reagan as
he sought the 1980 Republican presidential nomination. Citizens for
the Republic was joined in 1980 by PACs established by Senator Ed-
ward M. Kennedy and former Vice President Walter Mondale. An
analysis of their contributions to congressional candidates in 1982
showed a disproportionate level of support for safe incumbents.
357
This analysis indicates that the purpose of these PACs is to win support
for their sponsors in the presidential nomination race rather than to
hold or enlarge the Democratic contingent in Congress. The probable
next step for PACs is to move from promoting the nomination cam-
paigns of their sponsors to presidential PACs that support members of
Congress for the purpose of making them beholden to the President.
If the President accepts public financing, the PECFA mandates
that his personal campaign committee cannot accept private contribu-
tions in the general election.358 The campaign finance laws thus in-
crease the incentive for the President to raise funds for a PAC whose
purpose will be to enhance executive influence in Congress. The 1979
amendments to the FECA have somewhat diminished this incentive by
encouraging the President to raise money that local and state party
committees can use for grassroots campaigning on his behalf.359 But
this modest encouragement for party-oriented fundraising will be ab-
sent during the mid-term congressional season, leaving the President to
raise and spend money through a presidential PAC solely for the pur-
pose of working the executive will on Congress.
A fifth concern is the vast fundraising disparity that has arisen be-
354. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, No. 18, 95TH CON-
GRESS, PUBLIC FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 27 (1978).
355. See Cohen, supra note 132; Eaton, supra note 297; Taylor, supra note 4 at AS, col. 1.
356. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 177, at 328.
357. Cook, Presidential Hopefuls Funnel Contributions to Safe Races, 40 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2074-75 (1982).
358. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 109, 140-42 and accompanying text.
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tween the two political parties.36 ° In 1980, total receipts of Republican
local, state, and national party committees reached $164.1 million,
while their Democratic counterparts had receipts of $32.1 million.36'
In 1982, GOP committees raised $214.9 million, while Democratic
party groups raised $39 million.362 This five-to-one Republican advan-
tage widened in 1982: in actual dollars the Republican edge increased
from $132 million in 1980 to $174 million in 1982.
The funding difference between the two parties' organizations is
the crucial factor in overall Republican superiority in campaign fi-
nance. In 1980, Democratic general election candidates for Congress
spent $97.2 million, including party contributions of $1.5 million, and
benefitted from coordinated party expenditures of $1.4 million.
363
Hence, their direct campaign efforts were $98.6 million, with party sup-
port providing $2.9 million. Republican general election candidates
spent $93.6 million, including $4.2 million in contributions from party
groups, and were aided by party coordinated expenditures of $7.6 mil-
lion.3 4 In total, GOP candidates direct campaign efforts cost $101.2
million, with party money accounting for $11.6 million. If party funds
were omitted, Democratic candidates would have outspent Republi-
cans by a margin of $95.5 million to $89.6 million.
A similar pattern occurred in the 1980 presidential campaign. Ex-
penditures on behalf of Ronald Reagan in the general election were
$64.1 million, with the Republican National Committee accounting for
$4.6 million and state and local party efforts adding $15 million.
3 65
President Carter enjoyed total campaign support of $54 million. The
Democratic National Committee provided $4 million, while state and
local party units spent another $4 million on behalf of the President's
re-election bid.366 Without party efforts, the $64.1 million to $54 mil-
lion campaign advantage enjoyed by Ronald Reagan over President
Carter would have been reversed, with Carter spending $46 million to
Reagan's $44.5 million.
The crucial role of party organization spending can be illustrated
by examining total general election outlays by presidential and con-
360. Adamany, supra note 89, at 165-69.
361. FECReleases Final Fiures, supra note 141, at 3 (figures exclude public subsidies to
parties for party convention expenses).
362. FEC Final Reportfor 1981-82 Confirms Republicans Outspent Democrats, supra note
169.
363. FEC Releases Final Statistics, supra note 232, at 3-4.
364. Id.
365. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 299.
366. Id
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gressional candidates and party spending in 1980.367 Republican total
outlays can be estimated at $303 million, while Democratic outlays
were $179 million. The difference of $124 million closely approxi-
mated the $126.8 million by which Republican party committees out-
spent Democratic party organizations. 68
Republican superiority in financing elections is not new. Republi-
can presidential candidates and national party committees have out-
spent Democratic candidates and party groups, as well as their labor
affies, in every election in this century except the contests of 1912, 1916,
and 1960.369 What is new is that the Republican margin is accom-
plished by the financial muscle of its party committees rather than by
the funding advantage of its presidential candidates.
It is unclear whether the Democrats will be able to imitate the Re-
publican successes in mass fundraising by party organizations.37 ° It is
possible that PAC activity will favor the Republicans as more corpo-
rate PACs form and as PACs emphasize policy over incumbency when
giving money and campaigning.
In a period when party identification among voters has weakened
and traditional political machines have atrophied, money has become
increasingly important because it will buy modem campaign technolo-
gies that effectively reach voters. Under these circumstances, a sub-
stantial and apparently permanent Republican fundraising advantage,
organized by continuing party committees rather than by transient can-
didate organizations, constitutes a more troubling competitive imbal-
ance than did the Republican financing advantage of prior decades.
Indeed, such a continuing imbalance may pose a threat to the effective-
ness of electoral competition, which is the key to checking and holding
accountable those who hold public office.
367. These calculations combine the general election spending by Democratic and Re-
publican candidates for President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, as well as
the reported spending by local, state, and national political party committees (excluding the
amounts reported to the FEC as contributed to those candidates or as coordinated expendi-
tures spent on their behalf).
368. FEC Releases Final Figures, supra note 141, at 3.
369. The disparity in expenditures for the years 1904 through 1956 is found in A.
HEARD, supra note 270, at 16-20, while the expenditure data for the years 1956 through 1980
is found in H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 109.
These sources also show that Republicans generally outspent Democrats by a three to
one margin early in the century and usually by a two to one margin in the modem era. In
1976 and 1980, however, the disparity between Republican and Democratic presidential
campaign spending diminished because of the equalizing effect of the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act, which provided equal subsidies and fixed equal expenditure limits for
the major party candidates. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 177, at 5-6.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 195-98.
A sixth concern has already been elaborated: the shift in political
strength from political parties to political action committees.3 71 PACs
have almost achieved equality with parties in funding; they have
greatly exceeded parties in contributions to candidates and in in-
dependent expenditures; and they have the legal authority to wage
grassroots campaigns among their members, employees, or sharehold-
ers, although only labor unions have exploited this authority vigor-
ously. PACs, especially in the corporate sector, are likely to continue to
gain strength more rapidly than parties.37 2 The growth of business
PACs and, to a lesser extent, labor PACs can be directly attributed to
the FECA's authorization for corporations and labor unions to use
treasury money for PAC administration, solicitation, and operation.
One commentator has estimated that corporations alone spent $20 mil-
lion of treasury money in 1980 to operate their PACs. 373 New political
finance laws are not behind the expansion of ideological PACs; the fi-
nancing base of such PACs is the product of modem technology and
would have been legal prior to enactment of the FECA. On balance,
however, the complaint that the FECA has contributed substantially to
the shift in influence from parties to PACs has considerable merit.
A final concern is that modem campaign finance laws have caused
a great shift from party-oriented to candidate-oriented politics. There
is no doubt that such a shift has occurred but it is doubtful that the
FECA is a major cause of this shift. Instead, the key factors are the
decline in party organizational strength, the dominance of mass media,
and the availability of nonparty funds.
In 1980, political parties accounted for only 7.4 percent of direct
outlays and coordinated expenditures in the campaigns of general elec-
tion candidates for Congress. 374 They provided 12.2 percent of candi-
date-controlled funds in the 1982 general election campaigns of major
party candidates. 375 Parties, however, have never been principal sup-
pliers of money to candidates; rather, "political parties have historically
dealt largely in non-financial resources and have never successfully
made the transition to the cash economy of the new campaign poli-
tics."3 76 The FECA does limit party contributions and coordinated ex-
371. See supra text accompanying notes 270-94 and 309-10.
372. See E. Epstein, supra note 164, at 54-55.
373. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 412.
374. These calculations are party contributions and coordinated expenditures as a per-
centage of reported expenditures by general election congressional candidates plus party
coordinated expenditures. See FEC Releases Final Statistics, supra note 232, at 3-4.
375. See 1981-82 Congressional Spending, supra note 238.
376. Sorauf, supra note 72, at 451.
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penditures in candidate campaigns; but the 1979 amendments to the
FECA, the opportunities for institutional advertising, the latitude to
provide campaign services and to assist in field operations all en-
courage a much greater role than the parties are capable of assuming.
In light of the revitalization of Republican party financial strength, it
may be that parties are doing more now to assist candidates than they
have at any time in the modem era.
In sum, the palpable shift from party-oriented to candidate-ori-
ented politics does not have its root in the FECA. Modem politics
have undergone important institutional shifts-within parties, between
parties and candidates, between departments of the government, and
between parties and PACs. Yet very few of those shifts have been sig-
nificantly caused by the FECA or the other campaign finance laws.
The vast change in the status of parties must be attributed to forces far
larger and much longer in progress than the revision in campaign fi-
nance laws.
Conclusion
Neither the imminent demise of political parties nor the adverse
impact of campaign finance laws upon the parties is as obvious as has
been portrayed by commentators and critics. There is no doubt that
the American parties have changed dramatically. Old style political
organizations and activities have diminished. They have been replaced
by national party structures whose activities are surprisingly well
adapted to modem conditions. Employing mass media, computer com-
munications, polling, and a professional staff familiar with these tech-
niques, the Republican Party has engaged in party-oriented
campaigning, has provided campaign support for candidates, and has
offered organizational assistance to state and local party units. The
Democratic Party has engaged in similar, though much less extensive,
activities.
Parties may no longer be very effective in performing functions
that benefit the nation's political process. Their vote structuring and
mobilizing activities have plainly declined. Their ability to aggregate
and represent the nation's voting blocs and organized interests has
weakened. Although party organizations in America have never been
able to deliver "party government" in the model of Great Britain and
many other democracies, the national parties continue to be important
factors within the government. The evidence indicates that party ef-
forts to recruit candidates have become stronger in recent years.
The decline in traditional party activities can be traced primarily
to causes outside the realm of political finance. Media technology has
supplanted party organization as the main communications link be-
tween candidates and voters. Demographic and socio-economic
changes among the American people have weakened longstanding vote
blocs, shifted primary social interactions from neighborhoods to the
workplace, and changed citizens' political expectations and interests.
Laws and government operations have also weakened traditional
parties. Social services now fall within the purview of government
rather than of political organizations. Patronage and preferments are
neither widely available nor desirable as incentives for political in-
volvement. The spread of primaries, combined with changing cam-
paign technology, has largely removed control of nominations from
party organizations.
The changes in the nation's political processes were already well
underway when the Federal Election Campaign Act was passed. In-
deed, the Act's provisions give some preference to political parties in
their contribution and expenditure provisions. Even its much criticized
public financing of presidential campaigns has not had obviously
harmful consequences for political parties. They can make extensive
coordinated expenditures for media and other campaign activities to
support their presidential nominees and can spend virtually unlimited
amounts on canvassing and voter mobilization.
At the very least, the FECA has not been a barrier to the impres-
sive revitalization of party fundraising. The Republican Party now has
significant financial strength. Democratic efforts to become financially
competitive face obstacles, but they do not arise from the political fi-
nance laws. As Michael Malbin aptly observed: "For the most part,
the [FECA] has neither helped nor hurt the parties; it has simply stayed
out of their way.
' 3 77
The campaign finance laws indirectly have injured parties by loos-
ing awesome institutional competitors: political action committees.
The constitutionally mandated opportunity for ideological PACs to
make unlimited independent expenditures gives them a competitive ad-
vantage over parties. Congress can diminish this inequality by author-
izing greater party financial support for candidates or by raising the
limits on coordinated expenditures.
Corporations and labor unions compete with parties on a wholly
different footing. These entities are permitted by the FECA to employ
377. Malbin, What Should be DoneAbout Independent Campaign Expenditures?, 6 REGU-
LATION 41, 45 (1982).
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the vast resources they possess as the nation's major economic institu-
tions to operate PACs and solicit funds for PACs. Their use of treasury
money for advocacy and for registration and vote drives among stock-
holders, employees, and members is also authorized by law.
Corporations and unions are not citizens entitled to vote, but
rather are artificial persons created by law for limited economic pur-
poses.37 As such, their expenditures to operate PACs and to engage in
political campaigning seem at odds with the fundamental values that
focus our political system on the equality of voters in elections. 379 Ex-
penditures by corporate and union PACs significantly alter the contin-
uing competition for influence between individuals acting equally
through the suffrage and large institutions employing concentrated eco-
nomic power.
The impact of PACs is to weaken party roles in aggregating inter-
ests and in governance. PACs assume roles that parties play in cam-
paigns-supplying money to purchase polling technology and
communications media, mobilizing blocs of voters, and structuring the
vote through direct appeals to the members and stockholders of the
PACs' sponsoring organizations. PAC involvement in campaigns les-
sens the already modest reliance of officeholders on their parties and,
more importantly, greatly heightens the influence of PACs and their
sponsoring institutions in the governmental process.
There are strong reasons to curb the role of PACs. Corporate and
union PACs introduce massive inequalities of economic power into the
equalitarian political process. They jeopardize the ability of parties to
engage in activities that have important consequences for the demo-
cratic political process. The provisions of law which loosed PACs into
the political process should be repealed or revised. Corporate or union
PACs do not have to be entirely removed from the political arena. For
example, they could be allowed to operate using only voluntary contri-
butions. And, if the Supreme Court is willing, corporate and union
PACs should be prohibited from using treasury money for direct advo-
cacy both among stockholders and members and among the public at
large.
378. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 203, at 4.
379. Herbert Alexander has explained that: "The American system of government is
rooted in the principle of 'one man, one vote,' but, like other democracies, it is hobbled by
an unequal distribution of economic resources .... In a sense, broadly based political
power, as affected through universal suffrage, was conceived and has been used to help
equalize inequalities in economic power, despite frustrations brought on by the system of
financing politics." H. ALEXANDER, supra note 165, at 12.
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On balance, the parties continue to have impressive vitality as they
adapt to the modem technology of politics. The FECA has not signifi-
cantly weakened opportunities for parties to raise money. In fact, in
some respects it has given them preferred treatment. Additional steps
could be taken directly to strengthen parties.3"' Perhaps the most im-
portant measure to strengthen parties would be to withdraw the charter
for the nation's major economic institutions to finance the parties' prin-
cipal competitors, the political action committees.
380. The author has previously recommended a series of steps to diminish the influence
of large individual and institutional givers, stimulate political competition, encourage citizen
participation, and strengthen political parties. Among these proposals are (1) public financ-
ing of congressional campaigns, while permitting small contributors and political parties to
support congressional candidates, (2) modest public subsidies to political parties for organi-
zational activities, (3) allowance for individual contributions up to $250 to presidential can-
didates in general election campaigns, (4) higher limits for coordinated expenditures by
national political parties in campaigns for federal office, (5) extension to presidential and
congressional campaigns of the present authorization for state and local parties to make
unlimited registration and get-out-the-vote expenditures, (6) disclosure in all campaign ad-
vertising and on campaign materials of independent expenditure by groups, when pertinent,
that they have raised less than 50% of their funds in the affected district, (7) a limitation on
the aggregate contributions a candidate could receive from political action committees.
Adamany, PoilicalAction Committees and Democratic Politics, 1983 DE'r. C.L. REV. 1013;
D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 203, at ch. 11; cf Adamany, supra note 92, at 597-
602; Adamany, supra note 158, at 2-3; Democratic National Committee Task Force on In-
dependent Expenditures, supra note 157, at 80-90.
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